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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 4411
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. ISB No. 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Telefax: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck,
and Kirk Woolf

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,

Plaintiff,
v.

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.,
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF,
an individual,

)

Case No. CV -06-7097
DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

.

)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual,
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual,

DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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Counterclaimants,
v.

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS WATERS,
an individual,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Counter-defendants.

)

COMES NOW, defendant, Kirk Woolf, by and through counsel of record, Bryan D.
Smith, Esq., of the finn Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the court to instruct the jury with the attached requested
jury instructions numbered 1 through 12.
These instructions are in addition to the jury instructions requested by all other parties to
which Kirk Woolf has not objected.
Defendant specifically reserves the right to withdraw any of these instructions, or to
submit, revise or supplement these instructions to conform to proof presented at the time of trial.
Moreover, defendant reserves the right to object to the jury instructions filed by the
plaintiff.
DATED this

?

~)vday of February, 2009.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES,
PLLC

~iP~
Bryan D. S1i
Attomeys for Defendant Kirk Woolf

DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
cG;:fFebruary, 2009 I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight
delivery, addressed to the following:
[
[
[
[
[

~.Mail
]
]
]
]

Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq.
Lance J. Schuster, Esq.
John M. Avondet, Esq.
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Facsimile Transmission
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Courthouse Mail Box

[~S. Mail

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
Daniel Beck, Esq.
FULLER & CARR
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P. O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls. ID 83405-0935

[ 1 Facsimile Transmission
I 1 Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box

DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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:FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE

INSTRUCTION NO. - - The following facts are not in dispute:
1. Prior to September 26, 2006, Plaintiff put cooling water, reverse osmosis water and water
softener brine into the sanitary sewer service connected to Plaintiff s business premises.
(01122/07, Response to Request for Admission No. 21)

2. Printcraft does not own Block 1, Lot 5 of the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park
Subdivision. (10/26107 Response to Request for Admission No.3)
3. Printcraft Press never built any building in the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park
subdivision. (10/26/07 Response to Request for Admission No.4)
4. Printcraft Press never purchased any property from Sunnyside Industrial and Professional
Park, LLC or Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc .. (10/26107 Response to Request for
Admissions No.5 and No. 43).
5. Printcraft occupied the premises on Block 1, Lot 5 of the Sunnyside Industrial and
Professional Park subdivision in January of 2006. (10/26107 Response to Request for
Admission No. 11)
6. A contract existed between Sunnyside Park Utilities and Printcraft for the provision of
sew-er service and Printcraft breached the contract by discharging waste in violation of
state law, specifically IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03. (Memorandum Decision and Order dated
April 23, 2008, pg. 9).
IDJI 1.07 and referenced Admissions and Orders
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DUTY TO DISCLOSE (General)
INSTRUCTION NO.
Silence may constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. To establish a duty to
disclose, Printcraft has the burden of proving the following proposition by clear and convincing
evidence:
1.

Kirk Woolf knew of a fact;

2.

Printcraft did not know of the fact;

3.

Kirk Woolf knew that Printcraft did not know ofthe fact; and

4.

Both parties share a misconception about a basic assumption about the fact that is
so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties.

If you find fi'om your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven any

of the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for
Kirk Woolf. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all
of the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then you should treat Kirk
Woolf's failure to disclose the fact as a statement by Kirk Woolf of the non-existence of the fact.

Smvards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000).
Thieme v. Worst, 113 Idaho 455, 459, 745 P.2d 1076 (Ida.App. 1987)
Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 27, 936 P.2d 219 (Ida. App. 1997)

167
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-general)
INSTRUCTION NO.

Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1.

Kirk Woolf failed to disclose a fact to Printcraft and thereby Kirk Woolf is
treated as having made the statement that the fact did not exist;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

Kirk Woolf either knew the statement was false or were unaware of whether the
statement was true at the time the statement was made.

5.

Printcraft did not know that the statement was false;

6.

Kirk Woolf intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a
manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement:

8.

Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.

10.

The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have been
proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this issue.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has
not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Kirk Woolf.

161-'11
t1..

..1.
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IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified)
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-connections)
INSTRUCTION NO.

Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1.

That Kirk Woolf failed to disclose that the building to be occupied by Printcraft
could not be connected to Sunnyside Park Utilities septic system, and thereby
Kirk Woolf is treated as having made the statement that the building to be
occupied by Printcraft could be connected to Sunnyside Park Utilities septic
system;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

Sunnyside Park Utilities either knew the statement was false or was unaware of
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made.

5.

Printcraft did not know that the statement was false;

6.

Sunnyside Park Utilities intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.

10.

The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all

Page 5 of 16

the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for
Kirk Woolf.

IOJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified)
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-limitations)
INSTRUCTION NO.
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1.

That Kirk Woolf failed to disclose that the septic system had limitations as to
quantity of substances that could be discharged, and thereby Kirk Woolf is treated
as having made the statement that there were no quantity limitations on the septic
system;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

Kirk Woolf either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the
statement was true at the time the statement \vas made.

5.

Printcraft did not know that the statement was false;

6.

Kirk Woolf intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a
maimer reasonably contemplated;

7.

Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.

10.

The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all
the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for
Kirk Woolf.

is
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IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified)
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-Third Party Beneficiary
Agreement and Rules and Regulations)
INSTRUCTION NO.
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1.

That Kirk Woolf failed to disclose that the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement
and Rules and Regulations governed the building Printcraft was to occupy, and
thereby Kirk Woolf is treated as having made the statement that Third Party
Beneficiary Agreement and Rules and Regulations did not govern the building
Printcraft was to occupy;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

Sunnyside Park Utilities either knew the statement was false or was unaware of
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made.

5.

Printcraft did not know that the statement was false;

6.

Sunnyside Park Utilities intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement:

8.

Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.

10.

The nature and extent ofthe damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements
of iI-aud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all
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the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for
Kirk Woolf.

IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified)
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MATERIALITY
INSTRUCTION NO. - - "Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in determining the
party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a reasonable person would
attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the
transaction in question, or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to
know that the recipient is likely to regard the matter as impoliant in determining the
choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person would so consider.

IDJI 6.08.5
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RELIANCE
INSTRUCTION NO.
The term reliance means a voluntary choice of conduct by the person harmed and [implies] that
the person exercising it can decide between available alternatives. There is no reliance if the
party relies on its own judgment or investigations or its own examinations of the property
involved, or on the advice of third persons.
Black's Law Dictionary 1291 (6 th Ed. 1990)(Quoted in JvfcCormack v. Amsouth Bal1k, 759 So.2d
538 (Ala. 1999).
IYeitzel v. Jukich, 73 Idaho 301, 305, 251. P. 2d 542 (1952)

Nelsen v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354, 360, 218 P. 2d 345 (1950)
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REASONABLE RELIANCE
INSTRUCTION NO.
Reasonable reliance means that the party had the right to rely and that the reliance was justified.
In order for the reliance to be justified the reliance must have been rightful, defensible, and
warranted or sanctioned by law.

-Order, December 26,2007, p.3.
-Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500,507, 112 P.3d 788 (2005). ("One of the elements that must be
proven in order to establish fraud is justifiable reliance upon a false statement or
representation. ").

-Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Logging, 121 Idaho 247,251, 824 P.2d 178 (Ida.App. 1992).
-Black's Law Dictionary definition of "Justifiable" Revised Fourth Edition (1968).

16
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PROXIMATE CAUSE
INSTRUCTION NO.
When I use the express "proximate cause," or "proximately caused," I mean a cause that.
in natural or probable sequence, produce the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It
need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury,
loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have
occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about
the injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to
which each contributes to the injury.

IDJI 2.30.2-Proximate cause-"substantial factor," without "but for" test.
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I\UTIGATION OF DAMAGES

Instruction NO.

----

A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from the failure 10 exercise
such care cannot be recovered.

IDJI 9.14 Mitigation of damages

Page 15
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NO ENFORECEABLE CONTRACT
INSTRUCTION NO.
As a matter of law, the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement and Rules and Regulations are
not enforceable against Printcraft.
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Telefax: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck,
and Kirk Woolf

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
)
)
)
)
)
)

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,

Plaintift~

v.

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.,
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRlAL
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF,
an individual,
Defendants.

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRlAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual,
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual,

Case No. CV -06-7097
DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1

is

Counterclaimants,
v.

)
)
)

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS WATERS,
an individual,
Counter-defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, defendant, Doyle Beck, by and through counsel of record, Bryan D.
Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the court to instruct the jury with the attached requested
jury instructions numbered 1 through 12.
These instructions are in addition to the jury instructions requested by all other pm1ies to
which Doyle Beck has not objected.
Defendant specifically reserves the right to withdraw any of these instructions, or to
submit, revise or supplement these instructions to conform to proof presented at the time of trial.
Moreover, defendant reserves the right to object to the jury instructions filed by the
plaintiff.

'7/~-

DATED this ---,,,---,f__ day of February, 2009.
SMITH, DIUSCOLL & ASSOCIATES,

Attomeys for Defendant Doyle Beck

DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I ~fFebruary,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
2009 I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight
delivery, addressed to the following:
[
[
[
[
[

[
[
[
[
[

t-]/u. S. Mail
] Facsimile Transmission
] Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery
] Courthouse Mail Box

Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq.
Lance 1. Schuster, Esq.
John M. Avondet, Esq.
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

t.VtJ.S.~Mail
]
]
]
]

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
Daniel Beck, Esq.
FULLER & CARR
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P. O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

Facsimile Transmission
Overnight Delivery
:Hand Delivery
Courthouse Mail Box

DEI<"ENDANT DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1
1
.1...

S

FACTS NOT IN DISPUTE
INSTRUCTION NO. - - The following facts are not in dispute:
1. Prior to September 26, 2006, Plaintiff put cooling water, reverse osmosis water and water
softener brine into the sanitary sewer service connected to Plaintiff s business premises.
(01122/07, Response to Request for Admission No. 21)

2. Printcraft does not own Block 1, Lot 5 of the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park
Subdivision. (10/26/07 Response to Request for Admission No.3)
3. Printcraft Press never built any building in the Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park
subdivision. (10/26/07 Response to Request for Admission No.4)
4. Printcraft Press never purchased any propeliy from Sunnyside Industrial and Professional
Park, LLC or Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc .. (10/26/07 Response to Request for
Admissions No.5 and No. 43).
5. Printcraft occupied the premises on Block 1, Lot 5 of the Sunnyside Industrial and
Professional Park subdivision in January of 2006. (10/26/07 Response to Request for
Admission No. 11)
6. A contract existed between Sunnyside Park Utilities and Printcraft for the provision of
sewer service and Printcraft breached the contract by discharging waste in violation of
state law, specifically IDAPA 58.01.03.004.03. (Memorandum Decision and Order dated
April 23, 2008, pg. 9).
IDJI 1.07 and referenced Admissions and Orders
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DUTY TO DISCLOSE (General)
INSTRUCTION NO. - -

Silence may constitute fraud when a duty to disclose exists. To establish a duty to
disclose, Printcraft has the burden of proving the following proposition by clear and convincing
evidence:
1.

Doyle Beck knew of a fact;

2.

Printcraft did not know of the fact;

3.

Doyle Beck knew that Printcraft did not know of the fact; and

4.

Both parties share a misconception about a basic assumption about the fact that is
so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven any
of the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for
Doyle Beck. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all
of the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then you should treat Doyle
Beck's failure to disclose the fact as a statement by Doyle Beck of the non-existence of the fact.

SOH'ards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000).
Thieme v. Worst) 113 Idaho 455, 459,745 P.2d 1076 (Ida.App. 1987)
Dennett v. Kuenzli, 130 Idaho 21, 27, 936 P.2d 219 (Ida. App. 1997)

16 :3
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-general)
INSTRUCTION NO.
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1.

Doyle Beck failed to disclose a fact to Printcraft and thereby Doyle Beck is
treated as having made the statement that the fact did not exist;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

Doyle Beck either knew the statement was false or were unaware of whether the
statement was true at the time the statement was made.

5.

Printcraft did not know that the statement was false;

6.

Doyle Beck intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a
manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.

10.

The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the elements of fraud have been
proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this issue.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has
not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Doyle Beck.

1S
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IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified)
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-connections)
INSTRUCTION NO.
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1.

That Doyle Beck failed to disclose that the building to be occupied by Printcraft
could not be cOID1ected to Sunnyside Park Utilities septic system, and thereby
Doyle Beck is treated as having made the statement that the building to be
occupied by Printcraft could be connected to Sunnyside Park Utilities septic
system;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

Sunnyside Park Utilities either knew the statement was false or \vas unaware of
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made.

5.

Printcraft did not know that the statement was false;

6.

Sunnyside Park Utilities intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement:

8.

Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.

10.

The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all
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the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for
Doyle Beck.

IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified)
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-limitations)
INSTRUCTION NO.
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1.

That Doyle Beck failed to disclose that the septic system had limitations as to
quantity of substances that could be discharged, and thereby Doyle Beck is treated
as having made the statement that there were no quantity limitations on the septic
system;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

Doyle Beck either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the
statement was true at the time the statement was made.

5.

Printcraft did not know that the statement was false;

6.

Doyle Beck intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a
manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

Printcraft did rely upon the truth of the statement;

8.

Printcraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances:

9.

Printcraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.

10.

The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements
of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printeraft on this
issue. If you fInd from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all
the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for
Doyle Beck.
Page 7 of 16

IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified)
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FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (Printcraft fraud-Third Party Beneficiary
Agreement and Rules and Regulations)
INSTRUCTION NO.
Printcraft has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and
convincing evidence:
1.

That Doyle Beck failed to disclose that the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement
and Rules and Regulations governed the building Printcraft was to occupy, and
thereby I?oyle Beck is treated as having made the statement that Third Party
Beneficiary Agreement and Rules and Regulations did not govern the building
Printcraft was to occupy;

2.

The statement was false;

3.

The statement was material;

4.

Sunnyside Park Utilities either knew the statement was false or was unaware of
whether the statement was true at the time the statement was made.

5.

Printeraft did not know that the statement was false;

6.

Sunnyside Park Utilities intended for Printcraft to rely upon the statement and act
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated;

7.

PrinteraH did rely upon the truth ofthe statement;

8.

Printeraft's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

Printeraft suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement.

10.

The nature and extent of the damages to Printcraft, and the amount thereof.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has proven all the elements

of fraud by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for Printcraft on this
issue. If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that Printcraft has not proven all

Page 9 of 16

the foregoing propositions by clear and convincing evidence, then your verdict should be for
Doyle Beck.

IDJI 4.60 Fraud-issues (modified)

1
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MATERIALITY
INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
"Materiality" refers to the importance of the representation in determining the
party's course of action. A representation is material if (a) a reasonable person would
attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining a choice of action in the
transaction in question, or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to
know that the recipient is likely to regard the matter as important in determining the
choice of action, whether or not a reasonable person would so consider.

IDJI6.08.5
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RELIANCE
INSTRUCTION NO.
The term reliance means a voluntary choice of conduct by the person harmed and [implies] that
the person exercising it can decide between available alternatives. There is no reliance if the
party relies on its own judgment or investigations or its own examinations ofthe property
involved, or on the advice of third persons.
th

Black's Law Dictionary 1291 (6 Ed. 1990)(Quoted in McCormack v. Amsouth Bank, 759 So.2d
538 (Ala. 1999).
Weitzel v. Jukich, 73 Idaho 301, 305, 251. P. 2d 542 (1952)

Nelsen v. Hoff, 70 Idaho 354, 360, 218 P. 2d 345 (1950)
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REASONABLE RELIANCE
INSTRUCTION NO.
Reasonable reliance means that the party had the right to rely and that the reliance was justified.
In order for the reliance to be justifIed the reliance must have been rightful, defensible, and
warranted or sanctioned by law.

-Order, December 26,2007, p.3.
-Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 507,112 P.3d 788 (2005). ("One of the elements that must be
proven in order to establish fraud is justifiable reliance upon a false statement or
representation.") .

-Deulz-Allis Credit Corp v. Logging, 121 Idaho 247, 251,824 P.2d 178 (lda.App. 1992).
-Black's Law Dictionary definition of "Justifiable" Revised Fourth Edition (1968).

1...i.. 1"'t1 (,
,_'
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PROXIMATE CAUSE
INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
When I use the express "proximate cause," or "proximately caused," I mean a cause that,
in natural or probable sequence, produce the injury, the loss or the damage complained of. It
need not be the only cause. It is sufIicient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury,
loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have
occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent conduct of
two or more persons or entities contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about
the injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to
which each contributes to the injury.

IDJI 2.30.2-Proximate cause-"substantial factor," without "but for" test.

Page 14 of 16

MITIGATION OF DAMAGES
Instruction NO.
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from the failure to exercise
such care cannot be recovered.

IDJI 9.14 Mitigation of damages

1

..L

o
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NO ENFORECEABLE CONTRACT
INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

As a matter of law, the Third Party Beneficiary Agreement and Rules and Regulations are
not enforceable against Printcraft.
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
JetTrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
j eft@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho
corporation, TRA VIS WATERS, an
individual,
Case No.: CV-06-7097
PlaintitI/Counterdefendant,
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
vs.
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual,
KIRK WOOLF, an individual,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
The plaintiff Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard
St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully submits the following proposed j my instructions for
use at trial.

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 certify I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on February 16, 2009, 1
served a true and correct copy of the SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE SUMMARIES AND SIGN
on the following by the method of delivery designated below:
Mark Fuller
Fuller & Carr
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
Fax: (208) 524-7167

o

U.S. Mail

Hand-delivered

0

Facsimile

Bryan D. Smith
Smith, Driscoll & Associates
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731
Fax: (208) 529-4166

o

U.S. Mail

Hand-delivered

o

Facsimile

D

U.S.

Hand-delivered

o
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[DJI 1. 02 - Corporate parties

INSTRUCTION NO.

-1-

The corporations involved in this case are entitled to the same fair
and unprejudiced treatment that an individual would be under like
circumstances. You should decide this case with the same impartiality that
you would use in deciding a case between individuals.
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified _ __
Other
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ID.fII.20.1

Burden ofpro of - preponderance of evidence

INSTRUCTION NO.

~

When I say that a patiy has the burden of proof on a proposition, or
use the expression "if you find" or "if you decide." I mean you must be
persuaded that the proposition is more probably true than not true.
Given
Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - -

ID.JII.20.2

Burden olprool- clear and cOl1v;ncing evidence
INSTRUCTION NO.

!j

When I say a party has the burden of proof on a proposition by clear
and convincing evidence, I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly
probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher burden than the
general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true.
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified
Other - - - -

IDJI 1. 22 ~ Deposition testimony

INSTRUCTION

No.A

Certain evidence is about to be presented to you by deposition. A
deposition is testimony taken under oath before the trial and preserved in
writing. This evidence is entitled to the same consideration you would give
had the witness testified from the witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is
a record of the testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be
available to you during your deliberations.
Comment:
The last sentence has been added to IDJI 124 to anticipate inquiry from the jury.
Given - - - - Refused- - - Modified - - - Other - - - - -

IDJI 1.24.1 - Circumstantial evidence without de/Tnition

INSTRUCTION NO

~

Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no
distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a
reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such convincing force
as it may carry.
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - - -

IDJI 1.28 - Evidence admittedfor limited purpose

INSTRUCTION NO.

~

In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose.
called your attention to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you
that whenever evidence was admitted for a limited purpose, you must not
consider such evidence for any purpose other than the limited purpose for
which it was admitted.
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - - - - -
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IDJI 2.30.2 - Proximate cause - "subsfanf;aljactor, ., without "but/or" fest.

INSTRUCTION NO.

::1

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause that, in
natural or probable sequence, produced the injury, the loss or the damage
complained of It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a
proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occUlTed
anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the
fraudulent conduct of two or more persons or entities contributes
concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct of
each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which
each contributes to the injury.
Given - - - - Refused- - - Modified - - - Other - - - - -

! D.!! 4.60 - Fraud ~ issues (lvlodi/ied)

INSTRUCTION NO.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions by clear and convincing evidence:
1.

That the defendant failed to disclose inf01111ation to the

plaintiff:
2.

The failure to disclose the information left the plaintiff with

false knowledge about an existing situation or condition.
3.

The omitted infol111ation was material to the plaintiff;

4.

The defendant knew that the information existed and that the

plaintiff lacked the information.
5.

The plaintiff did not know that its knowledge about the

existing situation or condition was false;
6.

The plaintiff did rely upon the nondisclosures;

8.

The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the

circumstances;
9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by

reliance on the false statement.
10.

The nature and extent of the damages to the

plaintiff~

and the

amount thereof
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the
elements of fraud have been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then
your verdict should be for the plaintiff on this issue. If you find from your
consideration of all the evidence that any of the foregoing propositions has
.<

!

not been proved by clear and convincing evidence, then yom verdict should
be for the defendant.
Comment:
A definition of materiality can be found in IDJI 6.08.5.
See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz. Inc .. 134 Idaho 84, P.2d 303
(2000); Watts v. Krebbs, 131 Idaho 616, 962 P.2d 387 (1998); Magic Lantern Prods. Inc.
v. Dolsot 126 Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995).
See also, Witt v. Jones. 111 Idao 477, 722 P.2d 474 (1986): Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106
Idaho 700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Paw v. Greenwood, 101 Idaho 387, 613 P.2d 1338
(1980); Smith v. King, 100 Idaho 331 597 P.2d 217 (1979); King v. McNeeL Inc., 94
Idaho 444, 489 P.2d 1324.
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - - - - -

INSTRUCTION NO.

q

This is a case of "constructive fraud." That means there is no need for the
plaintiff to prove the defendants' actual intent to deceive. That intent is inferred directly
from the relationship.
Counl1y Cove Dev., Inc. v.

Given - - - Refused- - " - Modified - - Olher - - - - - - -

J\;fyrol1, ] 43

Idaho 595, 601, 150 P.3d 288, 294 (2006).

INSTRUCTION NO.

It}

Fraud may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Idaho State Tax Comm'n v. HaLl/zinger, 137 Idaho 401, 404, 49 P.3d 206,409 (2002).
Given

iHodified
--~--------

Other
~~~-

'1

.,!,

1

INSTRUCTION NO.

It

The term "material fact" refers to the importance of the misrepresentation or
omitted fact in determining a plaintiffs course of action. The importance of the alleged
non-disclosures in this case is for you to decide.

Watts

1'.

Krebs, 962 P.2d 387, 390 (Idaho 1998).

Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other
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INSTRUCTION NO.

(1

A duty to speak arises in situations where the parties do not deal on equal terms or
where information to be conveyed is not already in possession of the other party.

G&M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991).
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - - -

INSTRUCTION NO.

1,3;

A party is under a duty 10 disclose information in a transaction when the party
knows a

f~lCt

SOlrards

1'.

is material and is unknown to the other party.

Rathbun, 8 P.3d 1245 (Idaho 2000).

Given
Refused- - - Modified
Other - - - - - -

INSTRUCTION NO. ~
Fraud may be established by silence when a defendant had a duty to speak.

Chiarella

1'.

United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).

Given - - - Refused - - Modified - - Other - - - -

INSTRUCTION NO.

I4$'

When a septic system is designed, the system's minimum design t1O\v or capacity
is determined by statute. The law requires that the system meet two conditions. First.
septic tank must be large enough to handle two times the average daily t1ow. Second, the
minimum capacity for the system as a whole, as designed, must be 20 gallons per person
per day.
IDAPA 58.01.03.007.07b-08
Given

A10dijied

Other

"~-"--

------"-~

INSTRUCTION NO.

\tI

The minimum capacity for septic system design under these circumstances is 20
gallons per day per employee utilizing the Sunnyside septic system.
See IDAPA 58.01.03.007.08
Given - - Refused~ ____ _

f\;Jodified __~___

Other

17

INSTRUCTION NO.

n

Neither the terms "process waste" nor "process water" are defined by Idaho law.
See IDAPA 58.01.03
Given

Modified
Other

IDJI 9.00 - Cautionary instruction on damages

INSTRUCTION NO.
By glvmg you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not
express any opinion as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - - Other - - - - -
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ID.!I 9.01

Damage instruction for injuries to plaintifl general case (Modified)

INSTRUCTION NO.

J1

If the jury decides the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the
defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will
reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages proved to be
proximately caused by the defendant's conduct.
The damage the jury may consider are:
1. The Total Cost of the Lease Discounted to Present Value or

2. Costs to Collect, Store and Transport Sewage from the Time of Disconnection;
and
3. Moving Expenses Incurred as a Result of the Fraudulent Misconduct of
Sunnyside, Beck and Woolf and
4. Connection Costs to City ofldaho Falls Sewer System.
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury
to decide.
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - - -

11)J19.13

Present cash value
INSTRUCTION NO.

When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that
may accrue in the future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid
now which, \vhen invested at a reasonable rate of interest. \vould be
suftlcient to pay the future damages at the time and in the amount the future
damages will be incun-ed.
Given
Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - -

ID.!I 9. I4 - Mitigation

(~ldamages

INSTRUCTION NO.

~

A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to
minimize the damage and prevent fUl1her damage.

Any loss that results

from a failure to exercise such care cannot be recovered.
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - - - -

IDJI 9.20 - Punitive damages (Modified)

INSTRUCTION NO.

-»

If plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the
defendant's acts which proximately caused injury to the plaintiff were an
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct and that these acts
·were malicious, £l:audulent, oppressive or outrageous you may, in addition to
any compensatory damages to which you find the plaintiff entitled, award to
plaintiff an amount which will punish the defendant and deter the defendant
and others from engaging in similar conduct in the future. These damages
are called "punitive damages."
Given
Refused- - - Modified
Other - - - -

INSTRUCTION NO .

.!l:J

Punitive damages may be awarded when a defendant has committed fi·aud.
See IDAHO

CODE ANN.

§ 6-1604(1); s"ee also Walston

Idaho 211. 221, 923 P.2d 456, 466 (1996).
Given
Refilsed
.

~-----

Modified _~_~__
Other

11.

Monumental Life

11151.

Co., 129

INSTRUCTION NO.

Punitive damage awards are appropriate when the defendant is engaged in
deceptive business practices operated for a profit which pose a danger to the general
pUblic. Walston v, A10numental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 21 L 221, 923 P.2d 456. 466
(1996).
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - -

IDJ19.2o.5 -- Punitive damages - consideration oldelendant's wealth

INSTRUCTION NO.
You have been permitted to hear evidence peliaining to defendant's
wealth and financial condition.

This evidence was admitted far your

consideration only \vith reference to the question of pW1itive damages in
light of all other evidence befare you if you determine that such an award
should be made in this case.
Punitive damages are not a matter of right, but may be awarded in
the jury's sound discretion, which is to be exercised without passion or
prejudice. The law provides no mathematical formula by which such
damages are to be calculated, other than any award of punitive damages
must bear a reasonable relation to the actual hal111 done, to the cause thereof
to the conduct of the defendant, and to the primary objective of detelTence.
Comments:
See Robinson v. State Farm Insurance, 137 Idaho 173,45 P.3d 829 (2002).

Given - - - - Refused

----

Modified - - - Other - - - - -
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IDJI 6.27. 1

Fraud (A1odi/ied)

INSTRUCTION NO.
To establish the defense of fraud, the plaintiff has the burden proving by
clear and convincing evidence each of the following propositions:
1.

That the defendant failed to disclose information to the plaintiff;

2.

The failure to disclose the information left. the plaintiff with false

knowledge about an existing situation or condition.
3.

The omitted information was material to the plaintiff:

4.

The defendant knew that the information existed and that the plaintiff

lacked the information.
5.

The plaintiff did not know that its knowledge about the existing

situation or condition was false;
6.

The plaintiff did rely upon the nondisclosures;

8.

The plaintiff's reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;

9.

The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the

false statement.
10.

The nature and extent of the damages to the

plaintiff~

and the amount

thereof.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each
of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the
plaintiff.
Comment:
Materiality is defined in Instruction 6.08.5
Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - -

fDJ! 6.27.3 - Defense of non-disclosure (A1odffied)

INSTRUCTION NO.
A patiy is not obligated to perform a contract if that party establishes the
defense of nondisclosure.

To establish the defense of non-disclosure, the

defendant has the burden of proving each of the follovving propositions by clear
and convincing evidence.

1.

The defendants were aware of a fact vital to the essence of the

contract;
2.

The plaintiff was unaware of the fact, and could not reasonably learn

of it;
3.

The defendants knew that the defendant was una\vare of the true fact

and knew that disclosure of the true fact would cOITect a basic assumption upon
which the plaintiff was making the contract;
4.

The ddendants did not disclose the fact to the plaintin~ intending that

the defendant would act in ignorance of the fact;
5.

The failure to disclose the true fact amounts to a failure to act in good

faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing: and
6.

The plaintiff entered into the contract upon the reasonable

assumption that the non-disclosed fact did not exist.
If you find liOln your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each
of the foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the
plaintiff.
Comment:
There is not definitive Idaho authority on point. This instruction is felt to be
superior to the previous IDJI 651. See, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 161;
obiter dicta in Janinda v. Lanning, 87 Idaho 97 (1964).
"'I

..,
i}

The subject of duty to speak was tangentially addressed in Bethlahmy v. Bechtel,
91 Idaho 55, and Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, with references to
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 551. The committee feels the above instruction is
consistent with those cases and the tort restatement, although cast in light of the
Restatement of Contracts provisions.

Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - - -

JD.J! 6.40.! --Agency defined

INSTRUCTION NO.

')~

The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the
"principaL" to act for or in the place of the principal. A director or officer of
a company is an agent of the company. A company is responsible for any
act of the agent within the agent's scope of authority.
Given - - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other

1
L

~"'nr

I ,..( ,J

INSTRUC110N

No~1~

If a director or officer of a company commits or participates in fraudulent
conduct, whether or not it is also by or for a corporation, the director is personally liable
to the injured people, and it does not matter \vhether the corporation is liable or not.
Thus. a director or officer of a company can be held personally liable for fraud even if
you find that the company itself did not engage in fraud.

Eilopos v. Knox. 123 Idaho 400, 404-05
Given
Refused- - - Modified - - Other - - - - -

eet. App. 1992).

INSTRUCTION NO.

1;0

Silence in circumstances where a prospective purchaser might be led to harmful
conclusion is a form of representation.

Sorensen

1'.

Adams, 98 Idaho 708, 571 P.2d 769 (1977).

Given - - - Refused- - - Modified - - Other
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(208) 524-5400
FACSIMILE: (208) 524-7167
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SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PAR!<

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT
PRESS,
Idaho corporation,

INC. ,

Case No. CV-06-7097

an

Plaintiff,

ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME

v.
SUNNYSIDE
PARK
UTILITIES,
INC.,
an
Idaho
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK
OWNERS
ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
an
Idaho
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
AND
PROFESSIONAL
INDUSTRIAL
ted
PARK, LLC., an Idaho 1
liability company, DOYLE BECK,
an Individual, and KIRK WOOLF,
an Individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)

SUNNYSIDE
PARK
UTILITIES,)
INC. ,
an
Idaho
corporation, )
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND )
LLC.,
an)
PROFESSIONAL
PARK,
Idaho
limited
liability )
company,
)
)

Counterclaimants,

v.

)
)

)
)
)

PRINTCRAFT
PRESS,
INC. ,
an
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS )
WATERS, an Individual.
)
)

Counter-Defendants.

ORDER TO SHORTEN THE

1-

)
)

This matter having corne before this Court by and through the
Motion to Shorten Time filed by Sunnyside,

and good cause having

been shown,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the hearing on Defendants'
Limine

to

Exclude

Written

Leases

and

Lease Agreements shall be heard on Friday,

Testimony

Re:

February 27,

Motion
ltJritten

2009,

at

9:30 o'clock a.m.

NOTICE OF ENTRY
I

HEREBY

CERTIFY

foregoing

ORDER

this

day of

that

SHORTENING

I
TIME

to

2009.

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
FULLER & CARR
P.O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, 10 83405
Bryan D. Smith, Esq.
MCGRATH SMITH & ASSOCIATES
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, 10 83405
Michael Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado
Idaho Falls, 10 83404

BY:
ORDER TO SHORTEN TIME

mailed

-2-

the

a

conformed
parties

copy

of

the

listed below on

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Defendant.

On the 18th day of February, 2009, pretrial conference and
Plaintiff's motion in limine and Defendant's motion in limine
came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, in open
court at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. Michael Gaffney and Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf
of the Plaintiff.
Mr. Mark Fuller and Mr. Dan Beck appeared on behalf of the
Defendant.
Mr. Bryan Smith appeared on behalf of Defendants Doyle Beck
and Kirk Wolf.
Trial is scheduled for March 3,
last 8 days.

2009. Trial is scheduled to

There is a possibility that trial may continue into

a third week.
Mr.

Gaffney presented

Plaintiff's

motion

ln

limine.

Mr.

Fuller argued in opposition to the motion.

Mr. Gaffney presented

rebuttal argument.
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue a
decision as soon as possible.
Mr.

Fuller

presented

Defendant's

motion

in

limine.

Mr.

Gaffney presented argument in opposition to Defendant's motion in
limine.

Mr.

Smith joined in Defendant's motion in limine.

Mr.

Fuller presented rebuttal argument.
The Court will take the matter under advisement and issue a
decision as soon as possible.
Mr.

Smith advised the Court that he was filing a motion In

limine re: Woolf felony conviction of 25 years ago.
Mr. Smith addressed the Court in clarification of the Court's
ruling.
Court was thus adjourned.

District Judge
H:cv067097.7mo

CERTIFICATEJ OF SERVICE
,,1

I hereby certify that on the

!b

day of February, 2009, I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Michael Gaffney
Jeff Brunson
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Mark R. Fuller
Dan Beck
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID

83405

Bryan Smith
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID

83405
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICiAL pttpllllClo ._,
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVIEI::E4
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Case No. CV -06-7097
Plaintiff,
vs.

DECISION ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., and Idaho
Corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., and Idaho Corporation,
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, and Idaho
limited liability corporation,
Defendants.

Cunently before the Court are Plaintiff's motion in limine and Defendants
Sunnyside's motion in limine. Following oral argument the Court took the motions under
advisement and now issues its decision.
ANALYSIS
Trial comis have broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine. Sun Valley
Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767, 86 P.3d 475. 481
(2004). \Vhen presented with a motion in limine, a trial court has the authority to deny
the motion and wait until trial to determine if the evidence should or should not be
excluded. Gunter v. A1w]Jhy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16,25,105 P.3d 676, 685
(2005)(citing Lanham v. Idaho Pmver Co., 130 Idaho 486, 492, 943 P.2d 912, 918
(1997)).

DECISION ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE ..

J

At the outset, it is also worth noting that there have been multiple trial settings in
this matter as well as multiple motions and hearings regarding discovery disputes.
Continuances of the trial setting have occurred because of discovery and witness
disclosure disputes. At this point in time, there can be no excuse for failing to provide
required disclosures as to witnesses, exhibits, documents, evidence, etc. In view of this
history, a further continuance of the trial is not an option. Accordingly, any failure to
provide the required disclosures will result in the witness or evidence being precluded.
A. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN LIMINE

In its motion, Plaintiff raises a number of issues as to witnesses and evidence.
The COUli will take each issue separately.
1. Kirby Olson
Plaintiff seeks to preclude the testimony of Kirby Olson on the grounds that her
opinion is based on theory without any actual knowledge of discharge into the septic
system, concentrations, or alleged damages to the system. The Court agrees that
testimony not based on the actual facts pertaining to a matter is not particularly probative:
Ordinarily, testimony about mere possibilities rather than probabilities is
inadmissible because it is speculative or irrelevant and does not aid in the
fact-finding process.
State v. Schneider, 129 Idaho 59, 62, 921 P.2d 759,762 (App. 1996).

Defendants argue in part that Olson's testimony as to possibilities is now relevant
because that testimony is based on actual concentrations as determined by Plaintiffs
witness Roberi Starr. As such, Defendants assert that Olson's testimony is not
speculative and at least may be used to rebut the testimony of Starr.
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The Court finds that the opinions of Olson have been adequately disclosed.
However, testimony in the abstract that is not related to actual facts pertaining to this
matter is irrelevant. The Court can not at this time determine whether Olson's testimony
(or rebuttal testimony) will be relevant or probative. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion as
to Olson is denied at this time.
2. Tyler Bowles
Plaintiff seeks to preclude the testimony of Tyler Bowles on the grounds that his
opinions and the basis of his opinions has not been disclosed. At different times, Plaintiff
submitted interrogatories seeking disclosure of the "opinions" (Plaintiff'S First Set of
Interrogatories) of Defendants' experts as well as the factual basis and substance of each
opinion (Plaintiff's Fourth Set oflnterrogatories). The disclosure as to Bowles was that
he would testify regarding punitive damages and would testify in rebuttal to Plaintiff's
expert David Smith.
Defendants correctly asseli that this matter is not subject to Rule 26, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which require a party to produce written reports of experts, etc.
Defendants also take issue with Plaintiff's decision not to depose Bowles.
However, the duty to disclose the opinions and conclusions of an expert witness
rests with the party offering the expert, notwithstanding any decision by the opposing
party on whether to take a deposition. The Court finds that merely disclosing the general
nature or subject matter of Bowles' testimony is not an adequate disclosure of his
opinions. Accordingly, Bowles will be precluded from testifying.
3. Testimony of Actual Flows into the Septic System
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Plaintiff seeks to preclude testimony as to actual or estimated flows into the septic
system inasmuch as those flows were not metered or measurable until February 6, 2007,
approximately two months after the disconnect from Plaintiff to the system. Defendant
argues that Doyle Beck is in a position to offer testimony as to flows into the system.
Certainly, any testimony as to actual flows into the system must be based on a
proper foundation. There is some suggestion that Beck may make a reasonable estimate
offlows based upon the amount of water going into the Printcraft's premises. The Court
is unable to determine at this time whether there is a proper foundation for Beck to testify
regarding actual flows. Such a determination will need to be made at the time of trial.
Plaintiff s motion as to such testimony is denied at this time.
4. Lance Schuster
Plaintiff seeks to preclude or limit Defendants' examination of Lance Schuster,
who in the course of representing Plaintiff, was involved in an alleged trespass. The
Court finds that Schuster is a material witness to the alleged trespass and Defendants are
entitled to examine him. However, the examination will be limited to the facts
establishing the alleged trespass; questions as to why he was there and \vhat he was doing
are not relevant.
FurthelIDore, questions will be limited to the April 2, 2008 incident. Questions as
to other alleged trespasses will not be permitted. The Court previously put the Parties on
notice that it would not allow any additional claims. Defendants' Answer and
Counterclaim to Plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint raised additional claims of
trespass, and will not be permitted.
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While Defendants argue that the new trespass claims are compulsory
counterclaims required to be filed under Rule 13(a), LR.C.P., the COUli disagrees. The
alleged trespass arose after the transaction and occurrence which forms the basis of this
action. The alleged trespass arose in response to the existing dispute, not as pali of that
dispute. The Court specifically finds that the trespass claims are not compulsory
counterclaims in this matter.
Defendants further argue that the alleged trespasses are relevant to the claim of
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, that covenant is
derivative and contingent upon a contract and the terms contained therein. Idaho Power
Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750, 9 P.3d 1204, 1216 (2000); Taylor v.
BroYi'ning, 129 Idaho 483, 490, 927 P.2d 873, 880 (1996); Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss
Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 288,824 P.2d 841, 863 (1991)). That covenant only

requires that the parties perform in good faith the obligations set out in the contract.
Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P .3d 1104 (2005).

Allegations of alleged tortuous conduct in the nature of a trespass have no effect
on any alleged contractual obligations or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Accordingly, examination of Schuster will be limited to the issue of whether a
trespass occurred on April 2, 2008. Defendants' trespass claims, other than the claims
relating to the April 2, 2008 alleged trespass, are stricken and dismissed without
prejudice.
5. Trespass Damages
Plaintiff seeks to preclude Defendant from arguing or seeking to introduce
evidence as to Defendants' damages for the alleged trespass. While the record at this time
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does not identify actual damages arising from the trespass, that alone does not necessarily
preclude evidence which may be presented at the time of trial. However, the failure to
timely disclose alleged damages in response to discovery will preclude such evidence.
The record reflects that Doyle Beck testified that he was unaware of any damages
arising from the alleged trespass. Plaintiff has a right to rely upon that discovery response
in preparation for trial. Defendant can not introduce at trial evidence of alleged damages
which have not previously been disclosed in response to discovery. Accordingly,
argument or evidence as to actual damages arising from the trespass \vill be precluded.
Nominal damages may be awarded for trespass in the absence of actual damages.

Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P, 143 Idaho 641, 152 P.3d 2 (2006). Accordingly,
Defendant is not precluded from seeking nominal damages.
The Parties further raised the issue of whether Defendants may seek punitive
damages for the alleged trespass. Based on the foregoing ruling, it is appropriate for the
Court at this time to determine whether the issue of punitive damages as to the trespass
claim will be submitted to the jury. In considering the requirements of I.e. §6-1604(1),
the Court finds that even if the trespass is proved, the trespass does not include the type
of malicious or outrageous conduct vvhich would support a claim for punitive damages.
Accordingly, damages for the alleged trespass will be limited to nominal damages. 1
6. Evidence of Damages to the Septic System.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants should be precluding from offering any evidence
regarding damages to Defendants' septic system. This is again a question of foundation
as to the testimony of Defendants' expeli witnesses, and whether the testimony will assist

I While nominal damages are clearly available in a common law trespass claim (See rDJI 4.40), query
whether "nominal damages" in a claim under I.e. 6-202 are limited to $50.007
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the trier of fact. The Court at this time can not make that determination. A ruling as to
the admissibility of such testimony, upon an appropriate objection, will need to be made
at the time of trial.
7. Evidence of Testing and Sampling.
Plaintiff seeks to preclude any evidence obtained by Beck or Woolf during any
"authorized or unauthorized inspection" of Plaintiff s premises, primarily relying upon an
alleged absence of a "chain of custody" as to that evidence. The Court finds no basis to
preclude such evidence at this time. Again, the admissibility of such evidence will be
based upon a proper foundation. In some cases, the absence of a chain of custody will
make the evidence unreliable while in other instances, it simply goes to the weight of the
evidence. Plaintiffs motion on this issue is denied at this time.
8. Evidence of Cost to Repair or Upgrade.
Plaintiff seeks to preclude evidence of any alleged repair costs or costs to upgrade
Defendant's septic system. Whether any action of Printcraft resulted in costs to
Defendants for repairs or upgrades is a disputed issue of fact. Causation is an issue for
the jury. It is for a jury to determine whether the alleged repairs/upgrade were required
regardless of any action by Printcraft. Plaintiff s motion on this issue is denied.
B. DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE
Defendants' motion in limine also raised a number of issues, which are addressed
below.
1. Flooring Expenses
Sunnyside seeks to preclude evidence relating to expenses incurred in installing a
heavier fireproof floor at the Printcrafi premises. That expense was paid for by a non-
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party, however, it is alleged that Printcraft's monthly rent was increased due to that
expense.
Again, construction costs incurred by a non-party are generally not recoverable.
However, rental expenses paid, or to be paid, are particular to Printcraft and relevant to
Printcraft's claim. It is not uncommon for the cost of customized improvements to a
building to be amortized through monthly rental payments required of the tenant.
Ultimately, a jury will need to determine whether the amount of the rental payment was
reasonable and whether Printcraft is entitled to recover for rental payments. or any
portion thereof. Evidence of the actual flooring expense is not relevant except to support
a claim that the monthly rental payment (and the $600 monthly increase) was reasonable
and recoverable. Certainly, if there is no challenge to the amount of monthly rent,
flooring expenses and any summary of those expenses are irrelevant and inadmissible.
Accordingly, the Court finds that such evidence may be relevant for a limited
purpose, depending on the evidence and arguments made at the time of trial. Sunnyside's
motion on this issue is denied at this time.
2. Employee Expenses
Sunnyside seeks to preclude evidence, including a written summary, of employee
expenses allegedly incurred by Printcraft in relocating to the subject premises. While the
summary was timely produced, documents which form the basis for the summary were
not timely produced, despite those documents being requested in written discovery as
well as being the subject of discussion in depositions. \Vhile counsel at the time of the
deposition indicated a willingness to produce the underlying documents, that does not
negate the ongoing duty to produce such documents at least by the time of discovery
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cutoff, if not sooner. Parties have a clear right to timely receive disclosure of the other
party's evidence, particularly as to such fundamental evidence as to a party's alleged
damages.
The Court finds that the records which form the basis for a claim for employee
expenses allegedly incurred in relocating were not timely disclosed. As such, Printcraft
is precluded from presenting evidence as to such alleged employee expenses.
3. Moving Expenses
Sunnyside seeks to preclude evidence as to moving expenses, and particularly a
moving expense summary. Sunnyside's motion is primarily based on the argument that
many of the alleged expenses are inaccurate and/or have subsequently been withdrawn.
Again, any evidence of alleged damages in the nature of moving expenses (other than
employee expenses which have been excluded) must be based upon a proper foundation.
The Court can not make a determination at this time as to whether the claimed moving
expenses are based upon a proper foundation. SmIDyside's motion on this issue is denied
at this time.
4. The Sign
Sunnyside seeks to preclude evidence of a sign posted on or near the subject
property referring to an "industrial park". There are apparently no photographs of the
sign however Printcraft has had prepared a drawing of the sign and purports to have
witnesses who can authenticate that the drawing accurately reflects the sign located on
the premises.
Sunnyside correctly argues that the sign, and any statement thereon, can not be
the basis of any alleged misrepresentation. However, the sign may be probative to the
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issue of Printcraft' s "due diligence" in determining whether the site would meet its needs.
Statements on the sign, and any investigation or lack of investigation by Printcraft
because ofthe sign, may be probative to the issue of whether Beck or Woolf knew that
Printcraft was unaware of the limitations or restrictions on the septic system. Evidence as
to the location of the sign, the author of the sign, etc., would go to the weight of the
evidence. Accordingly, Sunnyside's motion on this issue is denied.
CONCLUSION

Consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiff's Motion in Limine is granted in part and
denied in pmi, and Defendants' Motion in Limine is granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this _ _ day of February, 2009 .
..~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day of February, 2009, I did send a true and conect
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective cOUlihouse mailbox:
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.

Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
FULLER & CARR
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-9035
Michael D. Gaffney
Lance 1. Shuster
Jeffrey D. Brunson
Beard st. Clair Gaffney
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495
Bryan D. Smith
McGrath, Smith & Associates
P.O. Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

Deputy Clerk
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -- ISB No. 4411
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 70 10
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Telefax: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck,
and Kirk Woolf

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,

Plaintiff:
v.

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.,
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF,
an individuaL
Defendants.

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRlAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual,
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual,
Counterclaimants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -06-7097

DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK
AND KIRK WOOLF'S
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

v.
PRlNTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an

Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS WATERS,
an individual,
Counter-defendants.

COME NOW the Defendants, Doyle Beck, and Kirk Woolf (hereafter collectively "Beck
and Woolf') and file Beck and Woolfs Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions.
I.

BECK AND WOOLF JOIN IN SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES' OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS.
On February 24, 2009, Sunnyside Utilities filed its objection to plaintiffs proposed jury

instructions. Beck and Woolf join in each and every objection Sunnyside Utilities raised in its
objection to plaintiff s proposed jury instructions and incorporate by reference each and every
objection SUllilyside Utilities raised in its objection to plaintiff s proposed jUly instruction.
II.

BECK AND WOOLF OBJECT TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GIVE ANY JURY
INSTRUCTIONS ON PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD CLAIMS.
The case of Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702 (2000) recogl11zes three bases for

imposing a duty to disclose on a party. This cOUli has already determined that the first two bases
from Sowards do not apply. As explained below, the third basis from S01+'ards likewise does not
apply to Beck and Woolf because there was no contract between them and the defendant
Printcraft Press, Inc. Moreover, no other Idaho law imposes on Beck and Woolf a duty to
disclose any information to Printcraft because there is no transaction between them. Because
Beck and Woolf owed Printcraft no duty of disclosure, the court should not give any jUly
instruction on Pritncraft's fraud claims.
DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 2
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A.

Beck And Woolf Owed No Duty To Disclose Any Information To Printcraft
Because There Is No Contract Between The Parties.

The Sowards case identifies three bases when a person may be under a duty to disclose
information. 134 Idaho at 707. This cOUli has previously ruled that the first two bases do not
apply in this case. As for the third basis, the Sowards cOUli explained that "[a] party may be
under a duty to disclose ... (3) if a fact known by one party and not the other is so vital that if the
mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows
that the other does not know it." ld. (emphasis added). Unsurprisingly, Sowards itself involved
a land sale cOlltract.
In setting forth the third basis from which a duty of disclosure may arise, the SO'wards
court relied on Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55,415 P.2d 698 (1966), and Janinda v. Lanning,
87 Idaho 91, 390 P.2d 826 (1964).1 Like Sowards, both Bethlahmy and Janinda arose from a
land sale contract between the parties. Moreover, the Janinda cOUli derived this duty to disclose
from Section 472 of the Restatement of Contracts. In sum, these cases and authorities establish
that there must be a contract between the parties before imposing a duty to disclose on a party
under the third basis from Sowards. This is particularly true where the lmv to determine the duty
to disclose requires that the undisclosed fact be "so vital that if the mistake were mutual the
contract would be voidable." (Emphasis added). This pOliion of the law makes no sense in the
absence of a contract between the parties like the ones that existed in Sowards, Bethlahmy and
Janinda.
Here, it is undisputed that there is no contract between Printcraft and Beck and Woolf.
This is clear from Printcraf1's Third Amended Complaint. Moreover, this court knows this fact
for itself from all the motions for summary judgment flIed in this case. There is simply no
DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 3
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contract that Beck or Woolf have with Printcraft, and Printcraft never alleges a contract between
it and Beck and Woolf. Because there is no contract between Printcraft and Beck and Woolf.
Beck and Woolf own no duty of disclosure to Printcraft under the third basis from S011'ards.
More specifically, Beck and Woolf owed no duty of disclosure to Printcraft because there could
be no mutual mistake such that the contract would be voidable because there is

flO

contract. As

such, the court should not give any jury instruction on Printcraft's fraud claims.
B.

Beck And Woolf Owed No Dutv To Disclose Any Information To Printcraft
Because There Is No Transaction Or Special Relationship Between The Parties.

Other than the third contractual basis for a duty of disclosure from Sowards, the only
other possible basis in Idaho law for imposing a duty of disclosure on Beck and Woolf comes
from Section 551 (2)( e) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides in pertinent part as
follows:
§ 5 5l. Liability For Nondisclosure

(2)

One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated,
(e)

facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to
enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because
of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other
objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of
those facts.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Section 551 (emphasis added).
Several Idaho cases have considered Section 551 (2)( e). In determining whether a pmiy
owes a duty of disclosure, these courts require both the existence of a transaction between the
parties and a special relationship between the parties. The Idaho Supreme Court in Watts v.
Krebs, 131 Idaho 616, 620 (1998), imposed a duty of disclosure in a partition transaction after

I The Bethlahmy case itself cited to Janinda.
DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 4
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recognizing that the parties had a special relationship as former spouses and cotenants of the
property to be partitioned. In Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 59 (1966), the Court imposed a
duty of disclosure on the contractor in a transaction involving the sale of property because the
buyer and seller had a confidential relationship. However, in St. Alphonsus Reg 'I J\;fed. Ctr. Inc.,
v. Krueger,

124 Idaho 501, 508 (Ct.App. 1992), the court imposed no duty of disclosure on a

hospital because although there was a transaction between the hospital and a doctor, there was no
special relationship between them as creditor and debtor.
Here, the court has already ruled that there is no special relationship between Printcraft
and Beck and Woolf.2 As such, the fIrst basis for finding a duty under Section 551(2)(e) is not
met. Further, there is no transaction between Printcraft and Beck or Woolf that could give rise to
a duty of disclosure under Section 551(2). Each of the transactions in 'Watts, Bethlahmy, and SI.
AlphonSliS was a first party transaction involving a direct relationship between the parties. No

such first party transaction exists between Beck and Woolf and Printcraft. Thus, the second basis
for finding a duty under Section 551(2)(e) is similarly unsatisfied
The Idaho Supreme Court's recent holding in BECO Construction Company, Inc. v. J-UB Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719 (2008) supports the conclusion that there is no transaction

between Beck and Woolf and Printcraft sufflcient to impose a duty of disclosure under Section
551. In BECO, the City of Pocatello hired J-U-B to engineer a project for the City. The City
separately hired BECO as contractor to construct the project. BECO and J-U-B both worked on
the project at the same time and frequently communicated with each other in their respective
duties on the project. Nonetheless, the Idaho Supreme Court held there was no transaction as
between J-U-B and BECO as follows:

See p. 14 of the Memorandum Decision and Order filed August 31,2007.
DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S
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The case at bar clearly involved a "commercial transaction" within the
meaning ofI.C. § 12-120(3), but the transaction was between the City and
RECD and not between J-U-B and RECD . ... The fact that J-U-B may have
been the City's agent is not sufficient to establish an independent commercial
transaction between J-U-B and BECO.
145 Idaho at 726.

In other words, although BECO and J-U-B were involved in the same transaction even on a daily
basis, they had not entered a transaction between themselves.
Here, just like the Court held in BEeO, just because Beck and Woolf and Printcraft were
involved in some "transaction" does not mean that they had entered a transaction between
themselves. There is no transaction between Beck and Woolf and Printcraft. As such, Section
551 provides no basis for imposing a duty of disclosure on Beck and Woolf and the court should

not give Printcraft any fraud instruction.
Ill.

CONCLUSION.
There is no contract, transaction, or special relationship between Beck and Woolf and

Printeraft. As such, Beck and Woolf owe no duty of disclosure to Printcraft: under the third basis
hom Sowards or Section 551 (2) of the Restatement (Second) of TOlis. Thus, the court should
not give Printcraft any fraud
DATED this

b

i~ction.

Y!;;.y of February, 2009.
SMITH,

DR!liCD14:r&~-&S9G

BY~~--------~-~~~~-
BryanD. Smi
Attorneys for Defendants,
Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2)-{~ebruary,

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS DOYLE BECK AND KIRK WOOLF'S
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF"S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS to be served by
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight delivery, addressed to the
following:
[
[
[
[
[

[
[
[
[
[

~.Mail
]
]
]
]

Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq.
Lance J. Schuster, Esq.
Jolm M. Avondet, Esq.
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Facsimile Transmission
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Courthouse Mail Box

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
Daniel Beck, Esq.
FULLER & CARR
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P. O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

] U.S. Mail
] Facsimile Transmission
] ~night Delivery
tJ"Hand Delivery
] Courthouse Mail Box
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. ISB No. 4411
B.1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Telefax: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck,
and Kirk Woolf

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOl\fNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,

)

Plaintiff:
v.

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.,
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF,
an individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -06-7097
DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S
REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
)
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
)
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
)
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
)
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual,
)
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual,
)
DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1
F:ICLlENTSIBDSI7965IJury InstructiollsI006 Defendant Doyle

t1 t3 1
1

Requested Jury Instructions.doc

Counterclaimants,
v.
PRlNTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and TRA VIS WATERS,
an individual,
Counter-defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, defendant, Doyle Beck, by and through counsel of record, Bryan D.
Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the court to instruct the jury with the attached supplemental
requested jury instructions numbered 13 through 17.
These instructions are in addition to the jury instructions requested by all other parties to
which Doyle Beck has not objected.
Defendant specifically reserves the right to withdraw any of these instructions, or to
submit, revise or supplement these instructions to conform to proof presented at the time of trial.
Moreover, defendant reserves the right to object to the jury instructions filed by the
plaintiff
DATED this

').- tt /t;;ebruary, 2009.
SMITH, DRlSCOLL & ASSOCIATE
PLLC

By: ____==__~_-~------------__
Bryan
Attorneys for Defendant Doyle Beck

DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1
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CERTIFI~F SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2009 I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL RI~QUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or
overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
[
[
[
[
[

~Mail
]
]
]
]

Facsimile Transmission
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Courthouse Mail Box

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ ]~night Delivery
[ 1 Hand Delivery
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box

Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq.
Lance J. Schuster, Esq.
John M. A vondet, Esq.
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
Daniel Beck, Esq.
FULLER & CARR
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P. O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

DEFENDANT DOYLE BECK'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
BECK PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This
form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you
now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT III--SEWER CONNECTION)
Question No.1: Did Beck know a fact that Printcraft did not know?
Answer to Question No. 1: Yes [__I

No[~

Question No.2: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be
voidable?
Answer to Question No.2: Yes

[~

No

Question No.3: Did Beck know that Printcraft did not know the fact?
Answer to Question No.3: Yes [__]

No[~

If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question _ _ . If
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question.
If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Beck had a duty to disclose a fact. Beck's
failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For the
following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Beck.
Question No.4: Was the implied statement false?
Answer to Question No.4: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No.5: Was the implied statement material?
Answer to Question No.5: Yes [_]

No[~

Question No.6: Did Beck know the implied statement was false, or was Beck unaware of
whether the implied statement was true?
Answer to Question No.6: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No.7: Was Beck unaware that the implied statement was false?
Answer to Question No.7: Y es

[~

No[~

Question No.8: Did Beck intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act upon it
in a manner reasonably contemplated?
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Answer to Question No.8: Yes

[---.J

No[_J

Question No.9: Did Beck rely upon the truth of the implied statement?
Answer to Question No.9: Yes [__]

No[_J

Question No. 10: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes

[---.J

No

[---.J

Question No. 11: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on
the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes

[---.J

No

[---.J

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question
_. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to
answer questions 12 and 13.
Question No. 12: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft?
Answer to Question No. 12:

Question No. 13: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately
caused by Beck's fraudulent non-disclosure?
Answer to Question No. 13: We award the following amount of damages:

.FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT IV--SE\VER CAPACITY)
Question No. 14: Did Beck know a fact that Printcraft did not know?
Answer to Question No. 14: Yes [_J

No

[---.J

Question No. 15: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be
voidable?
Answer to Question No. 15: Yes

[---.J

No

[---.J

Question No. 16: Did Beck know that Printcraft did not know the fact?
Answer to Question No. 16: Yes [_J

No

[---.J

If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question.
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. If

If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Beck had a duty to disclose a fact. Beck's
failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For the
following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Beck.
Question No. 17: Was the implied statement false?
Answer to Question No. 17 : Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 18: Was the implied statement material?
Answer to Question No. 18: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 19: Did Beck know the implied statement was false, or was Beck unaware of
whether the implied statement was true?
Answer to Question No. 19: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 20: Was Beck unaware that the implied statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 21: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 22: Did Beck intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act upon
it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
Answer to Question No. 22: Yes

~

No [_1

Question No. 23: Did Beck rely upon the truth of the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 23: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 24: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 24: Yes [_]

No[~

Question No. 25: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on
the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 25: Yes

[~

No[~

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question
_. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to
answer questions 12 and 13.
Question No. 26: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft?
Answer to Question No. 26:

Question No. 27: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately
caused by Beck's fraudulent non-disclosure?
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Answer to Question No. 27: We award the following amount of damages:

FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT V--THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
UTILITY AGREEMENT AND RULES AND REGULATIONS)
Question No. 28: Did Beck know a fact that Printcraft did not know?

[---.J

Answer to Question No. 28: Yes

No

[---.J

Question No. 29: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be
voidable?
Answer to Question No. 29: Yes

[---.J

No

[---.J

Question No. 30: Did Beck know that Printcraft did not know the fact?
Answer to Question No. 31: Yes

[---.J

No

[---.J

If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question.

. If

If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Beck had a duty to disclose a fact. Beck's
failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For the
following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Beck.
Question No. 32: Was the implied statement false?
Answer to Question No. 33: Yes

[---.J

No

[---.J

Question No. 34: Was the implied statement material?
Answer to Question No. 34: Yes

[---.J

No

[---.J

Question No. 35: Did Beck know the implied statement was false, or was Beck unaware of
whether the implied statement was true?
Answer to Question No. 36: Yes

[---.J

No [---.J

Question No. 37: Was Beck unaware that the implied statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 37: Yes

[---.J

No[_J

Question No. 38: Did Beck intend for Print craft to rely upon the implied statement and act upon
it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
Answer to Question No. 39: Yes

[---.J

No

[---.J

Question No. 40: Did Beck rely upon the truth of the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 41: Yes

[---.J

No

[---.J

Question No. 42: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances?

1767

Answer to Question No. 43: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 44: Did Printcraft sufler damages which were proximately caused be reliance on
the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 45: Yes

[~

No~

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question
_' If you answered "Yes" to each and every question fi'om question 4-11, then continue to
answer questions 12 and 13,
Question No. 46: What is the nature and extent of the damages suflered by Printcraft?
Answer to Question No. 47:

Question No. 48: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately
caused by Beck's fraudulent non-disclosure?
Answer to Question No. 49: We award the following amount of damages:
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
BECK'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
An agreement of compromise and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing
claims which the parties intended to settle thereby. The compromise agreement becomes the sole
source and measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing controversy.
If you find that the parties in good faith entered into an agreement compromising and
settling their adverse claims then the settlement agreement is a complete defense to any action
based upon any issues resolved by the settlement agreement.

Wilson v. Bogert. 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341 (1959)
Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 625, 151 P.3d 818 (2007)

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
BECK PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.
The defendant has asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and
satisfaction is a new contract which discharges the rights and obligations created by a previous
contract. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. A bona fide dispute existed between the parties as to the performance due under the
original contract;
2. The defendant offered some stated performance in full satisfaction of the obligation due
under the original contract;
3. The plaintiff accepted the performance offered, and understood or reasonably should
have understood, that it constituted full satisfaction of the obligation due under the
original contract.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the
foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that
any of the propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.

IDJI 6.23-Accord and Satisfaction
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OFFSET
BECK PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.
The defendant has asserted the defense of offset. Offset requires the jury to offset
amounts, if any, found to be due to the plaintiff against the amount found due to defendant, by
deducting the smaller from the larger, and returning its verdict for the party in whose favor a
balance is found due.

Shinn v. Smith, 81 Idaho 57, 60, 336 P.2d 690 (1959).

INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE
BECK PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.
The defendant has asserted the defense of independent intervening cause. An independent
intervening cause is a new and independent cause which breaks the causal cOlU1ection between
the original wrong and the injury. If you find that the conduct of the plaintiff or a arty was in fact
the cause of damages, as opposed to the conduct of Defendants', then you should not award such
damages to plaintiff.
lvfeyer v. Brown. 91 Idaho 369, 371, 421 P.2d 740 (1966).
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. ISB No. 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Telefax: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck,
and Kirk Woolf

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,

Plaintiff,
v.

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.,
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF,
an individual,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -06-7097
DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S
REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)

Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual,
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - Page I
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)

Counterclaimants,

)
)

v.

)
)

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and TRA VIS WATERS,
an individual,

)
)
)
)

Counter-defendants.

)

COMES NOW, defendant, Kirk Woolf, by and through counsel of record, Bryan D.
Smith, Esq., of the firm Smith, Driscoll & Associates, PLLC, and pursuant to the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, respectfully requests the court to instruct the jury with the attached requested
jury instructions numbered 13 through 17
These instructions are in addition to the jury instructions requested by all other parties to
which Kirk Woolf has not objected.
Defendant specifically reserves the right to withdraw any of these instructions, or to
submit, revise or supplement these instructions to conform to proof presented at the time of trial.
Moreover, defendant reserves the right to object to the jury instructions filed by the
plaintiff.
DATED this

'}--<i f::::;;ebrumy, 2009,
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES,
PLLC ____------______

By: - - - - " " = - - - , f Bryan D. S
Attomeys for Defendant Kirk Woolf

DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - Page 2
F:ICLIENTSII3DSI7965Vury Instructions\007 Defendant Kirk Woolf's Sup Requested Jury Instruetions.doe
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CERTIFI~~EOFSERVICE

1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
~a~'ebruary, 20091 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S SUPPLEMENTAL REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it
in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or
overnight delivery, addressed to the following:

J-.-

[~.Mail
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq.
Lance J. Schuster, Esq.
John M. Avondet, Esq.
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Facsimile Transmission
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Courthouse Mail Box

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ J))'vernight Delivery
[ 1 Hand Delivery
[ J Courthouse Mail Box

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
Daniel Beck, Esq.
FULLER & CARR
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P. O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

DEFENDANT KIRK WOOLF'S REQUESTED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS - Page 3
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\7965\)ury Instructions\007 Defendant Kirk Wool1's Sup Requested Jury Instructions.doc
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
WOOLF PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This
form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you
now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT III--SEWER CONNECTION)
Question No.1: Did Woolf know a fact that Printcraft did not know?
[~

Answer to Question No.1: Yes

No[~

Question No.2: \Vas the fact so vital that ifthe mistake were mutual the contract would be
voidable?
Answer to Question No.2: Yes

[~

No[_J

Question No.3: Did Woolf know that Printcraft did not know the fact?
Answer to Question No.3: Yes

[_~

No[~

If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question.

. If

If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Woolf had a duty to disclose a fact. Woolf
's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For
the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Woolf.
Question No.4: Was the implied statement false?
Answer to Question No.4: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No.5: Was the implied statement material?
Answer to Question No.5: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No.6: Did Woolfknow the implied statement was false, or was Woolf unaware of
whether the implied statement was true?
Answer to Question No.6: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No.7: Was Woolf unaware that the implied statement was false?
Answer to Question No.7: Yes [__]

No[~

Question No.8: Did Woolf intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act upon
it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
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Answer to Question No.8: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No.9: Did Woolf rely upon the truth of the implied statement?
Answer to Question No.9: Yes

L~

No[~

Question No. 10: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all ofthe circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 11: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on
the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes

[~

No[_J

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question
__ . If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to
answer questions 12 and 13.
Question No. 12: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft?
Answer to Question No. 12:

Question No. 13: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately
caused by Woolf s fraudulent non-disclosure?
Answer to Question No. 13: We award the following amount of damages:

FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT IV--SEWER CAPACITY)
Question No. 14: Did Woolf know a fact that Print craft did not know?
Answer to Question No. 14: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 15: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be
voidable?
Answer to Question No. 15: Yes

L~

No[~

Question No. 16: Did Woolf know that Printcraft did not know the fact?
Answer to Question No. 16: Yes

[~

No[~

If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question _ _ . If
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question.
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If you answered "Yes" to questions No, 23-25, then Woolf had a duty to disclose a fact. Woolf
's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For
the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Woolf.
Question No. 17: Was the implied statement false?
Answer to Question No. 17: Yes [_]

No [_1

Question No. 18: Was the implied statement material?
Answer to Question No. 18: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 19: Did Woolf know the implied statement was false, or was Woolf unaware of
whether the implied statement was true?
Answer to Question No. 19: Yes

L-.J

No[~

Question No. 20: Was Woolf unaware that the implied statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 21: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 22: Did Woolf intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
Answer to Question No. 22: Yes

[~

No

L-.J

Question No. 23: Did Woolf rely upon the truth of the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 23: Yes [_]

No [_1

Question No. 24: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 24: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 25: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on
the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 25: Yes

[~

No[~

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question
_' If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to
answer questions 12 and 13,
Question No. 26: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft?
Answer to Question No. 26:

Question No. 27: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately
caused by Woolf s fraudulent non-disclosure?
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Answer to Question No. 27: We award the following amount of damages:

FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE (COUNT V--THIRD PARTY BENKFICIARY
UTILITY AGREEMENT AND RULES AND REGULATIONS)
Question No. 28: Did Woolf know a fact that Printcraft did not know?
[~

Answer to Question No. 28: Yes

No[~

Question No. 29: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be
voidable?
Answer to Question No. 29: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 30: Did Woolf know that Printcraft did not know the fact?
Answer to Question No. 31: Yes

[~

No[~

If you answered "No" to any question between 1-3, then you should skip to question ___ . If
you answered "Yes to each question between 1-3, then continue to the next question.
If you answered "Yes" to questions No. 23-25, then Woolf had a duty to disclose a fact. Woolf
's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not exist. For
the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Woolf.
Question No. 32: Was the implied statement false?
Answer to Question No. 33: Yes

[~

No[_]

Question No. 34: Was the implied statement material?
Answer to Question No. 34: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 35: Did Woolf know the implied statement was false, or was Woolf unaware of
whether the implied statement was true?
Answer to Question No. 36: Yes [_]

No[~

Question No. 37: Was Woolf unaware that the implied statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 37: Yes [__]

No[~

Question No. 38: Did Woolf intend for Printcraft to rely upon the implied statement and act
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
No[~

Answer to Question No. 39: Yes

Question No. 40: Did Woolf rely upon the truth of the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 41: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 42: Was Printcraft's reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances?
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Answer to Question No. 43: Yes

[~

No[~

Question No. 44: Did Printcraft suffer damages which were proximately caused be reliance on
the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 45: Yes

l~

No[~

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 4-11, then you should skip to question
. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from question 4-11, then continue to
answer questions 12 and 13.
Question No. 46: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Printcraft?
Answer to Question No. 47:

Question No. 48: What is the amount of damages proven by Printcraft which were proximately
caused by Woolfs fraudulent non-disclosure?
Answer to Question No. 49: We award the following amount of damages:

17 0

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
WOOLF'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. ____
An agreement of compromise and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing
claims \vhich the parties intended to settle thereby. The compromise agreement becomes the sole
source and measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing controversy.
If you find that the pmiies in good faith entered into an agreement compromising and
settling their adverse claims then the settlement agreement is a complete defense to any action
based upon any issues resolved by the settlement agreement.

Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341 (1959)
Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 625,151 P.3d 818 (2007)
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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION

WOOLF PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.
The defendant has asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and
satisfaction is a new contract which discharges the rights and obligations created by a previous
contract. The defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. A bona fide dispute existed between the paIiies as to the performance due under the
original contract;
2. The defendant offered some stated performance in full satisfaction of the obligation due
under the original contract;
3. The plaintiff accepted the performance offered, and understood or reasonably should
have understood, that it constituted full satisfaction of the obligation due under the
original contract.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the
foregoing propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that
any of the propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.

IDJI 6.23-Accord and Satisfaction

1782

OFFSET

WOOLF PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. _ __
The defendant has asselied the defense of offset. Offset requires the jury to offset
amounts, if any, found to be due to the plaintiff against the amount found due to defendant, by
deducting the smaller from the larger, and returning its verdict for the pmiy in whose favor a
balance is found due.

Shinn v. Smith. 81 Idaho 57, 60, 336 P.2d 690 (1959).
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INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE
WOOLF PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. _ _
The defendant has asserted the defense of independent intervening cause. An independent
intervening cause is a new and independent cause which breaks the causal connection between
the original wrong and the injury. If you find that the conduct of the plaintiff or a miy was in fact
the cause of damages, as opposed to the conduct of Defendants', then you should not award such
damages to plaintiff.
NJeyer v. Brown, 91 Idaho 369, 371, 421 P.2d 740 (1966).
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237)
FULLER & CARR
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201
P . O. Box 5 0 93 5
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405-0935
TELEPHONE:
( 2 08) 524 - 54 00
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS/COUNTER CLAIMANTS SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.
SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC.

Mill

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT
PRESS,
Idaho corporation,

INC. ,

an )

Plaintiff,

)

v.

)
)

SUNNYSIDE
PARK
UTILITIES,
INC.,
an Idaho corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK
OWNERS
ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
an Idaho
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
AND
PROFESSIONAL
INDUSTRIAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability corporation,
DOYLE
BECK, an individual, and KIRK
WOOLF, an individual.

)
)

Defendants.

SUNNYSIDE
PARK
UTILITIES,
INC.,
an Idaho corporation,
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND
PROFESSIONAL
PARK,
LLC,
an
Idaho
limited
liability
corporation.
Counterclaimants,
v.

Case No. CV-06-7097

)
)

SUNNYSIDE'S OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS )
)
WATERS, an individual.
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)
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COME NOW the Defendants,

Sunnyside Park Utilities,

Inc.,

an

Idaho corporation, and Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park,
LLC,

an Idaho limited liability company
and

"Sunnyside")
Proposed

Jury

file

Sunnyside's

Instructions.

(hereafter collectively

Objections

Sunnyside

does

not

to

Plaintiff's

object

to

the

instructions not discussed herein.

PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.7

I.

Printcraft's Proposed Instruction NO.7 is asserted to be the
IDJI 2.30.2 proximate cause instruction. However, Printcraft fails
to identify that Printcraft has modified the stock instruction by
substituting the word "negligent" for "fraudulent" in the second
paragraph of the instruction.

Printcraft has no claim for fraud

and this instruction does not address non-disclosure. Jury may be
confused and misled by this instruction.
II.

PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 8

Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No.8 is a modified version
of

the

failed

IDJI
to

4.60

cite

modifications

affirmative

any

that

case

fraud

law which

Printcraft

has

instruction.
would

Printcraft has

support

introduced

the

into

numerous

the

stock

instruction and instead changes the stock propositions including
subparts 1,2,3,4,5, and 9.

There is no support for any of these

modifications in the cited case law, which all follow the standard
IDJI

instruction

4.60

and

are

cited

in

the

comments

of

such

standard instruction.
III. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.9
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Printcraft's Proposed Instruction NO.9 attempts to eliminate
any need for Printcraft to prove any intent by the defendants.
Printcraft's

sole

source

of

authority

for

this

proposed

jury

instruction comes from dicta in a footnote to Country Cove Dev.,
Inc.

v.

143 Idaho 595,

Myron,

country Cove,

601,

150 P.3d 288,

294

(2006).

In

the plaintiff argued that because the defendant had

violated its obligations as

a

fiduciary,

the plaintiff

need to prove all of the elements of fraud.

did not

143 Idaho at 601. The

Court stated that "[t]he gist of a constructive fraud finding is
to avoid the need to prove intent

(i.e.,

knowledge of falsity or

intent to induce reliance), since it is inferred directly from the
relationship and the breach.

II

Id.

The Court also noted that the

authority that it was commenting on " ... treats constructive fraud
essentially
However,

as

the

a

synonym

Appellate

for

breach

of

in

Court

fiduciary

Country

Cove,

duty.

Id.

II

made

no

determination of this issue, holding that it was not raised before
the reply brief and would not be considered on appeal. This Court
has previously held that

there

is no fiduciary relationship or

relationship of trust and confidence in this case. See Memorandum
Decision and Order entered August 31,

2007, pg. 14 and Memorandum

Decision and Order entered February 12, 2009, pg. 5, fn. 1.
Furthermore,

the

third prong of

prong dealing with fiduciary relationships),
Printcraft

to

prove

knowledge

by

(unlike

Sowards

the

the

first

explicitly requires

defendants.

Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d 1245 (2000).

Sowards

v.

Because there is

no fiduciary relationship between the parties from which knowledge
of

falsity or intent to induce reliance could be inferred

(the
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parties only "bumped into" each other five times between 2001 and
January

23,

2006

when

Printcraft

moved

into

the

building),

Printcraft must still be required to prove each and every element
of

fraudulent

non-disclosure

including knowledge of

falsity and

intent to induce reliance.
Printcraft's Proposed Instruction NO.9 should not be given
to the jury because it is unsupported by any applicable Idaho case
law specific to the facts of this case. The dicta in Country Cove
must not be allowed to overrule numerous other cases

requiring

proof of both knowledge of falsity and intent to induce reliance.
IV.

PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 10

Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No.

10

is duplicative of

Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No.5, which is IDJI 1.24.1. " A
trial court need not give a requested instruction,
if it is a correct statement of the law,

Wright, Docket No.

34017

even

if the subject matter is

sufficiently covered by other instructions
State v.

however,

given

to

(Ct.App. 2-6-2009)

the

jury.

II

(referencing

State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 511, 129 P.3d 1258, 1260 (Ct.App.
2005). There simply is no reason to give this instruction as it is
already adequately covered by another instruction.
V. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 11

Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 11 fails to include any
definition

of

materiality.

contract materiality)

Both

IDJI

and Watts v.

6.08.5

Krebs,

(Interpretation of

131 Idaho 616

(1998),

contain a definition of materiality in addition to simply stating
that ,,[t] he term 'material fact'
misrepresentation or omitted

refers to the importance of the

fact

In

determining

a

plaintiff's
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course of action."
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's Proposed Instruction No.
11 should not be given and instead the Court should instruct the
jury regarding materiality by giving IDJI

6.08.5,

set

forth

in

Sunnyside's proposed instruction No. 10.
VI. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 12

Printcraft's

Proposed

Instruction No.

12

is

an

incomplete

statement of the duty to disclose and is unnecessary if a proper
duty to disclose instruction based upon Sowards v. Rathbun, 8 P.3d
1245

(Idaho 2000)

is given as contained in Sunnyside's proposed

Instructions No. 2,4,6, and 8.
While Printcraft's proposed instruction is a quote from G & M
Co., it is incomplete and misleading because it

Farms v. Funk Irr.

does not address
Farms,

the

the elements of a duty to disclose.

Court

analyzed

knowledge

of

the

In G

defendant

& M

and

specifically held that "knowledge of these operational and design
defects was known only to Lindsay and discoverable by G & M Farms
only after purchase and installation of the extensive irrigation
system."

119

Idaho 514,

521,

808

P.2d 851

(1991).

The analysis

conducted in G & M Fanns is identical to the analysis in the third
prong of Sowards. A duty to disclose jury instruction in this case
should be based upon the third prong of Sowards.
VII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 13

Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No.

13 claims to be based

upon Sowards v. Rathbun, however it is not the standard set forth
in Sowards.
the

first

It is established by prior orders in this case that
two

prongs

of

Sowards

do

not

apply

to

Printcraft' s

SUNNYSIDE'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1t-'T,qg·
..t.
v..

5

claims.

Memorandum Decision and Order,

See

August 31,

2007,

pg.

14. Sunnyside asserts that the third prong of Sowards should be
given as it is written in Sowards,

if the Court determines that

the existence of a duty to disclose is an issue for the jury to
decide. The third prong of Sowards states that a duty to disclose
may exist:
vital

" ... if a fact known by one party and not the other is so

that

if

the

mistake

were

mutual

the

contract

would

be

voidable, and the party knowing the fact also knows that the other
does not know it." Sowards v. Rathbun, 134 Idaho 702, 707, 8 P.3d
1245

(2000);

and 8.
third

See

Sunnyside's Proposed Instructions No.2,

4,

6,

Printcraft's misstatement of the standard required by the
prong

of

eliminates

Sowards

significant

portions

of

the

proof Printcraft must establish in order for a duty to disclose to
exist. Printcraft should be required to establish each part of the
third prong of Sowards. Sunnyside objects to any effort to reduce
the

burden

of

proof

mandated

by

Sowards

to

create

a

No.

14

is

13

and

duty

to

disclose.
VIII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 14

Printcraft's

Proposed
Proposed

Instruction

duplicative

of

Furthermore,

the instruction fails to note the limiting language

in the following sentence:

Instruction

No.

merely

"But such liability is premised upon a

duty to disclose between parties to a transaction.
United States,

445 U.S.

unnecessary.

222,

230

II

Chiarella v.

(1980). Also instructive is the

following footnote in Chiarella:
The dissent of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN suggests that the
'special facts' doctrine may be applied to find that silence
constitutes fraud where one party has superior information to
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another. This Court has never so held... The decision in Strong

v. Repide was premised upon the fiduciary duty bet.ween the
corporate insider and the shareholder.
Chiarella

v.

United

States,

omitted; emphasis added).

445

U.S.

222,

fn.

10.

(Citations

Chiarella v. United States, addressed a

fiduciary duty under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and would fall under the first prong of Sowards, which is
not applicable here. See Memorandum Decision and Order, August 31,
pg. 14.

2 0 07,

The few words set forth in Proposed Instruction No. 14 do not
explain to the jury the nature and scope of Sunnyside's duty to
disclose,

if any, or the elements of fraud by non-disclosure. Nor

does the instruction suggest that a confidential relationship is
required

Sowards,

to

establish

such

a

duty

under

the

first

prong

of

or that the Court has previously determined that such a

confidential relationship does not exist in this case as a matter
of law.
IX. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 15 AND NO. 16

Printcraft's proposed instructions 15 and 16 are simply an
attempt to convince the jury that the actual flows from Printcraft
were 20 gallons per day per employee because Printcraft does not
have any evidence of resulting flows.
that are pertinent
given.

If

Obendorf v.

"[O]nly jury instructions

to the pleadings and the evidence should be

Terra Hug Spray Co. / 145 Idaho 892,

899,

188

P.3d 834 (2008). The septic system was not designed or constructed
specifically for Printcraft.

There is no claim or cause of action

that suggests that the septic system was improperly designed when
it was constructed in 1996. At that time,

Sunnyside had no idea
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that Printcraft would ever consider moving into the subdivision.
Printcraft has never asserted that the system was not designed ln
accordance with IDAPA. Furthermore, the inspection and approval of
the system establishes that the system was init
constructed

in

accordance

with

ly designed and

(Notably,

IDAPA.

the

approved

design used on the 1996 permit and inspection was not 20 gpd). The
Court's February 12, 2009 Order states as follows:
IDAPA 58.01.03.007
specifically relates
to design and
construction standards, which applied at the time the septic
system was originally constructed. While this septic system
may have been in violation of the design requirements if
originally designed and built for Printcraft, the connection
at issue in Printcraft's motion is an 'additional' connection
made after the completion of the design and construction.
As such, the Court finds that Printcraft's
governed by IDAPA 58.01.03.004.04.
February 12,

2009 Memorandum Decision and Order,

connection

pg.

5

is

(Emphasis

Added). Because connection of the building occupied by Printcraft
in 2005 was an "additional" connection and the septic system was
not

originally designed and built

for

Printcraft,

the

original

design of the septic system is irrelevant. The jury should not be
instructed on an issue that is irrelevant.
Printcraft's proposed jury instructions No.
cause

the

jury to believing that

the

resulting

15 and 16 will
flows

into the

system were 20 gallons per person per day. Instructions should not
be given if the requested instruction constitutes an impermissible
comment as
697,
be

to the evidence.

183 P.3d 782
given

if:

(1)

(Ida.App.

See State v.
2008)

Edney,

145 Idaho 694,

("A requested instruction must

it properly states

the

governing

law;

(2)

a

reasonable view of at least some of the evidence would support the
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defendant's

legal

instruction

is

instructions;

theory;

addressed

not

and

the

(3 )

the

(4 )

subject

of

adequately

the

requested

other

by

instruction

requested

jury

does

not

consti tute an impermissible comment as to the evidence. ").

IDAPA

58.01.03.007 is not the law governing Printcraft's connection. See

Memorandum Decision and Order,

February 12,

2009,

p.

5.

Neither

Printcraft's Proposed Instructions No. 15 or 16 should be given to
the jury.
X. PROPOSED INSTURCTION NO. 17

Printcraft's proposed instruction No.
any

issue

already

still

remaining

been granted

in

summary

action for breach of contract.
April 23, 2008, p.

this

17 is not relevant to

litigation.

judgment

on

Sunnyside

Sunnyside s
I

has

cause

of

See Memorandum Decision and Order

9. Furthermore, the correspondence between the

parties established that the only relevant definition of "process
waste"

was Sunnyside's definition.

dated September 26, 2006.
be

instructed

on

the

See Letter of Lane Erickson,

(Sunnyside's Exhibit AN.) The jury is to

law

by

the

Court,

however,

there

is

no

requirement that the jury be instructed on what the law is not.
IDAPA

58.01.03

does

which

includes

all

Printcraft

cannot

not

constitute

extant

statutes

establish that

the
I

entirety of

case

these

law

terms

and

Idaho

law,

regulations.

are not

elsewhere

defined in the law of Idaho.
XI. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 19

The jury should not be allowed to consider the "Total Cost of
the Lease Discounted to Present Value" because no evidence of such
damages

were

produced

by

Printcraft

prior

to

the

discovery
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deadline.

On

February

II,

2009

Printcraft

for

the

first

time

submitted written lease agreements and a claim for the total cost
of the lease discounted to present value, supported by an untimely
disclosed expert opinion of David M. Smith, CPA. This evidence is
the subject of a Motion in Limine.
Furthermore,

subpart three jointly refers to all defendants,

making all defendants
the others.
terms

liable for the alleged non-disclosures of

Sunnyside further objects to Printcraft's use of the

"fraudulent

misconduct"

"fraud by non-disclosure."
these

elements

address

of

personal

No case

economic

inj ury

when

Printcraft's

is

for

law is presented to support

damage.

claims,

claim

not

IDJI

9.01

claims

is

for

intended

fraud

by

to

non-

disclosure.
XII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 20

Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No. 20 only relates to the
lease claim in David Smith's Supplemental Expert Report, which was
first

submitted to Defendants after

passed.

the

discovery deadline had

Printcraft should not be allowed to present evidence of

ten years'

of

lease payments and therefore

this

instruction is

irrelevant. without the untimely Supplemental Opinion of David M.
Smith,

which

should be

excluded,

the

jury will

have

no expert

opinion on which to base a present cash value determination.
XIII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 22

Printcraft has added the following sentence to the end of the
model

jury

instruction:

"These

damages

are

called

'punitive

damages. '" Printcraft provides no explanation for why it adds this
sentence,

and it does not appear to serve any purpose.

Neither
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this sentence nor the IDJI 9.20 title should be included on the
instructions submitted to the jury.
Furthermore,
was

the

there is no allegation that any non-disclosure

result

of

malice,

affirmative

fraud,

oppression,

or

outrageous conduct by Sunnyside. The instruction should require a
finding that

'these acts were fraud by non-disclosure,'

the sole

basis of recovery pled by Printcraft. See Third Amended Complaint,
Counts 3, 4, and 5.
XIV. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 23

Printcraft's
duplicative
damages.

of

Proposed

the

Furthermore,

model

Instruction
jury

No.

instruction

23

IS

regarding

merely
punitive

in addition to a fraudulent non-disclosure,

the acts must be an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of
conduct.

Printcraft' s

Instruction No.

23 should not be given to

the jury.
XV. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 24

Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No.

24 is covered by IDJI

9.20 which is already Printcraft' s Proposed Jury Instruction No.
22. Submitting both Proposed Jury Instructions will simply confuse
the

The

jury.

proper

standard

is

IDJI

9.20,

fraudulent non-disclosure as pled by Printcraft.

modified

for

(See Section XIII

above) .
XVI. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 25

IDJI

9.20.5

misstates

Idaho

law by

stating

that

"the

law

provides no mathematical formula by which such damages are to be
calculated,
Code

If

Section

by reason of
6-1604.

the

Although

SmlNYSIDE'S OBJECTIONS TO
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II

, ..' , )

calculation

should

not

be
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revealed

to

the

jury,

the

provision

in

the

instruction denying

that such law exists should be removed from the instruction,
the

final

sentence should begin:

and

"Any award of punitive damages

must bear... " so as not to mislead the jury.
XVII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 26 and 27
Printcraft's

Proposed

affirmative defense to a
defense

of

fraud

or

Instructions

No.

26

and

27

state

an

breach of contract action based on the

the

defense

of

fraudulent

non-disclosure.

Sunnyside has already been granted Summary Judgment on its claim

See Memorandum Decision and Order, April

for breach of contract.
23,

2008,

p.

9.

Printcraft's liability on Sunnyside's

breach of contract is not an issue the

claim for

jury will decide,

so the

jury does not need to be instructed on affirmative defenses to the
contract.
Furthermore,

Printcraft

has

significantly

modified

IDJI

6.27.1, omitting the element of falsity and modifying the reliance
element.

Printcraft' s

proving Printcraft' s

Instruction

No.

27

places

defense upon Sunnyside:

the burden of proving ... ".

Subpart

3 requires

the

burden

of

" ... the defendant has
defendants

to prove

that "defendants knew that defendant was unaware of the true fact"
which is not logical.

Subpart 4 requires Sunnyside to prove that

Sunnyside did not disclose a

fact

to Printcraft,

Sunnyside would act in ignorance of the fact,

intending that

an element which is

not part of any defense. Subpart 11, requiring Printcraft to offer
to

return

Neither

any

proposed

unjust

enrichment

instructions

26

benefits,
or

27

has

should be

been
given

omitted.
to

the

jury.
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XVIII. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 28

Printcraft's Proposed Instruction No.
6.40.1. However,

that

Printcraft has modified the IJDI, adding language

"a director

Company,"

28 claims to be IDJI

or officer of

a

company
that

identifying

without

is

an

agent

Printcraft's

of

the

proposed

instruction is a modification and without any authority for the
modification.

Sunnyside asserts

that

the unmodified IJDI

6.40.1

should be given to the jury. See Sunnyside's Proposed Instruction
No. 26.
XIX. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 29

This
E.Iiopulos

instruction
v.

Knox,

directors of a bank.

a

quotes
case

from

AM

addressing

JUR

dicta

contained

in

statutory

liability

of

The language quoted refers to commission of

an affirmative tort and Printcraft cites no authority that such
liability

attaches

to

non-disclosure.

Printcraft' s

proposed

instruction modifies liability from "third person injured thereby"
to

the

ambiguous

term

"inj ured people,"

seeking

to

expand

the

field from those persons reasonably expected by the directors to
be affected, i.e. the parties to the transaction (in this case CTR
Development,
Sunnyside

who

Park

paid

for

Utili ties)

and
to

all

acquired

the

downstream

connection
"people"

who

and
may

somehow be affected by the transaction. The jury will be misled as
to both the directors'

liability and the class of third parties

governed by this AM JUR dicta, which is no part of the holding of
Eliopulos.

The actual holding of Eliopulos found no liability of

any director of the bank under any statutory or common law theory.
Proposed Instruction No. 29 is not the law in Idaho and should not

SUNNYSIDE'S OBJECTIONS TO

PLAIN~~8~PROPOSED

JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 13

be given to the jury.
XX. PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 30

Printcraft's
duplicative

of

Proposed

Proposed

No.

Instruction

Instruction

No.

13.

30

is

merely

Furthermore,

the

existence of a duty is a legal determination for the Court.

See

Sunnyside's

the

Pretrial

Brief.

If

the

Court

believes

that

existence of a duty to disclose is an issue for the jury to decide
the

Court

should

simply

instruct

the

jury

on

factors

to

be

considered under the third prong of Sowards. The record is clear
that Printcraft purchased no property from defendants and owns no
property in the subdivision.

Printcraft was never a

"prospective

purchaser" and this instruction will confuse and mislead the jury.
XXI. PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

Printcraft's

Proposed

Special

Verdict

Form

should

not

be

given because it contains numerous errors.
Printcraft's

Proposed

Special

Verdict

attempts

to

avoid

proving the allegations of fraudulent non-disclosure made in the
Third Amended Complaint and instead requires only proof that the
various

defendants

information about
Because

fraud

"fraudulently
the

must

be

septic
pled

fail [ed]

system to
with

to

disclose

Printcraft

particularity,

material

Press,

Inc.

Printcraft

1/

1S

limited to proving the particular allegations of fraud set forth
in its Third Amended Complaint. The proposed Special Verdict form
would expand Printcraft's claims beyond the pled fraudulent nondisclosures to other "information" not specified in the complaint.
The special verdict form given should be specific to each Count of
Fraudulent Non-disclosures contained in Printcraft's Third Amended
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Complaint.
In addition,

the special verdict form for a fraudulent non-

disclosure cause of action must necessarily include all required
elements. This is because the absence of anyone element is fatal
to the claim. Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp.,

141 Idaho 233,

239,

108 P.3d 380 (2005). As written, Printcraft's special verdict form
will

confuse

prove

is

a

the

jury into

(1) failure

believing

to disclose;

damages.

Printcraft

must

evidence,

(1) a duty to disclose;

that

all

Printcraft must

(2)proximate cause;

establish,

by

clear

and

and

(3)

convincing

(2) a failure to disclose that is

treated as an affirmative misrepresentation of the non-existence
of

the

information

disclosed;
about

the

falsity;
the

(3)

falsity;

falsity;
(6)

that

Printcraft

(4)

(5)

claims

materiality;

that

(5)

Printcraft

in

was

and

a

manner

reasonably

reasonable

(10)

under

damages.

all

know about

contemplated;

the

(See IJDI 4.60;

special verdict

form for

that

(7 )

(8) that Printcraft's

circumstances;

Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 59, 415 P.2d 698

The

been

that Sunnyside knew

did not

Printcraft did rely upon the non-disclosure;

cause;

have

that Sunnyside intended for Printcraft to act upon

falsity

reliance

should

(9)

proximate

See also Bethlahmy v.

(1966)).

the

fraudulent non-disclosure

causes of action must be specific to the causes of action pled in
Printcraft's complaint.
try

any

other

Sunnyside is not prepared or willing to

fraudulent

non-disclosure

claim.

Furthermore,

because of the nature of a fraud claim,

the Special Verdict Form

must

elements

specifically

individually.

See

identify

all

Sunnyside's

ten

Proposed

Special

of

the

claim

Verdict
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form
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submitted on February 24, 2009.

DATED this

day of February, 2009.

Mark R. Fuller
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed
below on this

c~~

day of February, 2009:

Document Served:

SUNNYSIDE'S OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

Attorneys Served:

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, 1083404
Bryan Smith
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, 1083405-0731
Fax: 529-4166

_ _ U.S. Mail
~ Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

_ _ U.S. Mail
Facsimile
-----''"'--_ _ Hand Delivery

~t:iJl
Mark R. Fuller
FULLER & CARR
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB No. 4411
B. 1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB No. 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. O. Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Telefax: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Defendants, Doyle Beck,
and Kirk Woolf

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,

Plaintiff,
v.

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.,
An Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an Idaho
corporation, SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL
AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability corporation, DOYLE
BECK, an individual, and KIRK WOOLF,
an individual,
Defendants.

SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
Corporation, DOYLE BECK, an individual,
and KIRK WOOLF, an individual,
Counterclaimants,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV -06-7097
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
SUPPLEMENTAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Page 1

F:ICLlENTSISDSI7965IJury Instructionsl003 Brief in Support of Supplemental Jury Instructions.doc

1802

v.
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS WATERS,
an individual,
Counter-defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

COME NOW the Defendants, Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf (hereafter collectively "Beck
and Woolf') and file this Brief in Support of Supplemental Jury InstllJctions.
JRCP 51(a)(1) states that "No later than five (5) days before the commencement of any trial
by jury, any party may file written requests that the cOUli instllJc1 the jury on the lay\! as set forth in
such request..." FUlihennore, IRCP 51(a)(1) allows the court to "reasonably permit any pmiy to
file and serve written requests for instllJctions at any time up to and including the close of the
evidence." There are two possible grounds for allowance oflate disclosure of jury instructions: (1)
matters arising during the trial of the action which could not reasonably have been anticipated by
the pm"ty requesting such instllJctions; or (2) if the instllJctions "were overlooked in the original
instructions." IRCP 51(a)(1).
The Court's order required the parties to file proposed jury instllJctions.

However, thc

Court's order specifically stated "The parties need not submit IDJl2 instllJction number 1.01
tlu'ough 1.43." See Order dated July 8, 2008. Based on that instllJction Beck and Woolf did not
submit a proposed special verdict form based on IDJI 1.43.1. Beck m1d Woolf now submit a
proposed special verdict fonn in accordm1ce with IRCP 51(a)(1).
FUlihennore, Beck and Woolf have fOUl1d that they overlooked jury instllJctions regarding
affinnative defenses contained in paragraphs 114 (settlement agreement), 116 (accord m1d
satisfaction), 122 (offset), and 124 (independent intervening cause). Beck m1d Woolf now submit
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 2
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proposed jury instructions on these issues and asks that the Court reasonably pennit them to conect
their o\vn enor in overlOOkiltt~ instructions.
DATED this

2- C1 day of February, 2009.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSQCIATE
.

--

-----~--

--"..~

Blyan D.
Attorneys for Defendants,
Doyle Beck and Kirk Woolf

CERTIFICATE nVICE

~ Lj

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of February, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT nF SUPPLEMENTAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS to be served by placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid, or by hand delivery, facsimile transmission, or overnight
delivery, addressed to the following:

[~Mail
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Jeffrey D. Brunson, Esq.
Lance J. Schuster, Esq.
John M. Avondet, Esq.
Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Facsimile Transmission
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Courthouse Mail Box

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
Daniel Beck, Esq.
FULLER & CARR
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
P. O. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ ] SJ:vernight Delivery
Hand Delivery
[ ] Courthouse Mail Box

[ -r

~~~
Bryan D. Smitl
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237)
FULLER & CARR
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201
P . O. Box 5 0 93 5
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83405-0935
TELEPHONE:
( 2 08) 524 - 54 00
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS/COUNTER CLAIJVTANTS SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC.
AND SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT
PRESS,
Idaho corporation,

INC. ,

an )

Case No. CV-06-7097

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

SUNNYSIDE
PARK
UTILITIES,
INC.,
an Idaho corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK
OWNERS
ASSOCIATION,
INC. ,
an Idaho
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL
AND
PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability corporation,
DOYLE
BECK, an individual, and KIRK
WOOLF, an individual.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
SUPPLEMENTAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUNNYSIDE
PARK
UTILITIES,
INC.,
an Idaho corporation, )
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND )
PROFESSIONAL
PARK,
LLC,
an )
Idaho
limited
liability )
)
corporation.
)
)
)

Counterclaimants,
v.

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and TRAVIS
WATERS, an individual.
Counter-defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
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1

COME NOW the Defendants,

Sunnyside Park Utilities,

Inc.,

an

Idaho corporation, and Sunnyside Industrial and Professional Park,
LLC,

an Idaho limited liability company

"Sunnyside

ll

(hereafter collectively

and file this Brief in Support of Supplemental Jury

)

Instructions.
IRCP 51(a) (1) states that "No later than five (5) days before
the commencement of any trial by jury, any party may file written
requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth
in such request ... " Furthermore,

IRCP 51 (a) (1)

allows the court to

"reasonably permit any party to file and serve written requests
for instructions at any time up to and including the close of the
evidence.

II

There are two possible grounds for allowance of late

disclosure of
trial

of

jury instructions:

the

action

which

(1)

could

matters arising during the
not

reasonably

have

been

anticipated by the party requesting such instructions; or (2)
the instructions

if

"were overlooked in the original instructions."

IRCP 51 (a) (1) .
The Court's order required the parties to file proposed jury
instructions. However,
parties
1.43.

II

need

not

the Court's order specifically stated "The

submit

IDJI2

See Order dated July 8,

instruction number
2008.

1.01

Based on that

through

instruction

Sunnyside did not submit a proposed special verdict form based on
IDJI 1.43.1. Sunnyside now submits a proposed special verdict form
in accordance with IRCP 51(a) (1).
Furthermore,
instructions
paragraphs

Sunnyside

regarding
114

has

found

affirmative

(settlement

that

it

defenses

agreement) ,

116

overlooked
contained
(accord

jury
in
and
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satisfaction),

122

(offset),

and

124

(independent

intervening

cause). Sunnyside now submits proposed jury instructions on these
issues

and

asks

that

the

Court

reasonably permit

Sunnyside

to

correct its own error in overlooking these instructions.

DATED this

day of February, 2009.

OJ6Y

Danlel R. Bec-ok---------Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the
following described pleading or document on the attorneys listed
below on this

day of February, 2009:

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF SUPPLEMENTAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Document Served:

Attorneys Served:

_ _ U.S. Mail

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery
~-

Bryan Smith
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731
Fax: 529-4166

_ _ U.S. Mail
)L Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

FULLER & CARR
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MARK R. FULLER (ISB No. 2698)
DANIEL R. BECK (ISB No. 7237)
FULLER & CARR
410 MEMORIAL DRIVE, SUITE 201
P.O. Box 50935
IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405-0935
TELEPHONE: (208)524-5400
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANTS SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., AND SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho)
corporation,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., an Idaho )
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE
PARK )
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an)
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE)
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL)
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability )
company, DOYLE BECK, an Individual, )
and KIRK WOOLF, an Individual,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)

Case No. CV-06-7097

DEFENDANTS'SUPPLEMENTAL
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

)
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an )
Idaho
corporation,
SUNNYSIDE )
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL)
PARK, LLC., an Idaho limited liability )
company, DOYLE BECK, an Individual)
and KIRK WOOLF, an Individual,
)
)
Counterclaimants,
)
)

v.
DEFENDANTS'
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l

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporation and TRAVIS WATERS, an
Individual,

)
)
)
)

Counter-defendants.

)
)

--------------------------)
COMES NOW, Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., and Sunnyside Industrial and
Professional Park, LLC., by their counsel of record, Mark R. Fuller, and respectfully
requests the Court to give the attached supplemental Jury Instructions numbered

31

through ---=-~,_ to the jury.
DATED this

~

L4

day of February, 2009.

Mark R. Fuller
Fuller & Carr

DEFENDANTS'

SUPPLEJ:c1ENTAL REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -

181.0
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
HEREBY CERTIFY that I served a true and correct copy of the following
described pleading or document on the attorneys listed below on this

l"

I/M...

day of

February, 2009:
Document Served:

DEFENDANTS'SUPPLEMENTAL
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Attorneys Served:

Michael D. Gaffney, Esq.
BEARD ST. CLAIR
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

_ _ U.S. Mail
~
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Bryan Smith, Esq.
SMITH DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Fails, ID 83405

_ _ U.S. Mail
~
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Mark R. Fuller
FULLER & CARR

DEFENDANTS'

SUP~LEMENTAL

1 11

REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO'--t.L-f-An agreement of compromise and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing claims
which the parties intended to settle thereby. The compromise agreement becomes the sole source and
measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing controversy.
If you find that the parties in good faith entered into an agreement compromising and settling
their adverse claims then the settlement agreement is a complete defense to any action based upon any
issues resolved by the settlement agreement.

Wilson v. Bogert 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341 (1959)
Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 Idaho 622, 625, 151 P.3d 818 (2007)

APPROVED _ __
REJECTED _ __
MODIFIED _ __
OTHER _ __

Page 6 of 9
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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION

SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The defendant has asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and satisfaction is
a new contract which discharges the rights and obligations created by a previous contract. The
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1.

A bona fide dispute existed between the parties as to the performance due under the original
contract;

2.

The defendant offered some stated performance in full satisfaction ofthe obligation due under
the original contract;

3.

The plaintiff accepted the performance offered, and understood or reasonably should have
understood, that it constituted full satisfaction of the obligation due under the original contract.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that any of the
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.

IOJI 6.23-Accord and Satisfaction

APPROVED _ __
REJECTED _ __
MODIFIED _ __
OTHER _ __
Page 7 of 9
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OFFSET
SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO. ~
The defendant has asserted the defense of offset. Offset requires the jury to offset amounts, if
any, found to be due to the plaintiffs against the amount found due to defendants, by deducting the
smaller from the larger, and returning its verdict for the party in whose favor a balance is found due.

Shinn v. Smith, 81 Idaho 57, 60, 336 P.2d 690 (1959).

APPROVED _ __
REJECTED _ __
MODIFIED _ __
OTHER _ __

Page 8 of 9
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INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE
SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO.

~

The defendant has asserted the defense of independent intervening cause. An independent
intervening cause is a new and independent cause which breaks the causal connection between the
original wrong and the injury. If you find that the conduct of Printcraft or a third party was in fact the
cause of damages, as opposed to the conduct of Defendants, then you should not award such damages
to Printcraft.
Meyer v. Brown, 91 Idaho 369, 371,421 P.2d 740 (1966).

APPROVED _ __
REJECTED _ __
MODIFIED _ __
OTHER _ __
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

SUNNYSIDE'S INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This form
consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
BREACH OF CONTRACT

Question No.1: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities prove additional damages, which were not previously
awarded by the Court, for Printcraft's breach of the contract?
Answer to Question No.1: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

If you answered this question "No" skip question 2. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the
next question.
Question No.2: What is the amount of additional damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities for
Printcraft's breach of the contract?
Answer to Question No.2: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING

Question No.3: Did Printcraft act in good faith and deal fairly with Sunnyside Park Utilities in Printcraft's
performance of the contract?
Answer to Question No.3: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

If you answered this question "No" skip question 4. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the
next question.
Question No.4: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities for Printcraft's
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
Answer to Question No.4: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

TRESPASS

Question No.5: Did Printcraft or Printcraft's agents go upon Sunnyside Park Utilities' land?
Answer to Question No.5: Yes

[~

No [_1

1816
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If you answered this question "No" then there was no Trespass and you should skip question 6. If you
answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No.6: Did Printcraft have consent from Sunnyside Park Utilities to enter upon Sunnyside Park
Utilities land?

[_1

Answer to Question No.6: Yes

No

[_1

If you answered this question "No" then there was no Trespass. If you answered this question "Yes,"
then you have found Printcraft committed Trespass. Continue to question No.7 to determine if the
trespass was a Willful Trespass.
Question No.7: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities' property posted with "No Trespassing" signs, spaced at
intervals of not less than one (1) notice per six hundred sixty (660) feet along Sunnyside Park Utilities'
property?

[_1

Answer to Question No.7: Yes

No

[_1

FRAUD
The jury must find the following propositions to have been proven by clear and convincing evidence:
Question No.8: Did Printcraft state a fact to Sunnyside Park Utilities?

[_1

Answer to Question No.8: Yes

No

[_1

Question No.9: Was the statement false?
Answer to Question No.9: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

Question No. 10: Was the statement material?
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

Question No. 11: Did Printcraft know the statement was false, or was Printcraft unaware of whether the
statement was true at the time the statement was made?
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

Question No.12: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities unaware that the statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 13: Yes

[-1

No

[_1

Question No. 14: Did Printcraft intend for Sunnyside Park Utilities to rely upon the statement and act
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
Answer to Question No. 15: Yes

[_1

No

[-1

Question No. 16: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities rely upon the truth of the statement?

Page 2 of 9
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[_1

Answer to Question No. 17: Yes

No

[_1

Question No. 18: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities' reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 18: Yes [_1

No [_1

Question No. 19: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities suffer damages which were proximately caused be
reliance on the statement?

[_1

Answer to Question No. 19: Yes

No

[_1

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 8-19 then Sunnyside Park Utilities has not
proven fraud and you should skip to question 22. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from
question 8-19 then continue to answer questions 20 and 21.
Question No. 20: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Sunnyside Park Utilities?
Answer to Question No. 20: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 21: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were
proximately caused by Printcraft's fraud?
Answer to Question No. 21: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

FRAUDULENT NON-DISClOSURE

Question No. 22: Did Printcraft make a partial or ambiguous statement of fact which was misleading to
Sunnyside Park Utilities?
Answer to Question No. 22: Yes [_1

No [~

If you answered this question "No" answer questions 23-25. If you answered this question "Yes," skip
questions 23-25 and begin answering question 26.
Question No. 23: Did Printcraft know a fact that Sunnyside Park Utilities did not know?
Answer to Question No. 23: Yes

[_1

No [_]

Question No. 24: Was the fact so vital that ifthe mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable?
Answer to Question No. 24: Yes [_] No [_1
Question No. 25: Did Printcraft know that Sunnyside Park Utilities did not know the fact?
Answer to Question No. 25: Yes

r_l

No [_]

Page 3 of 9
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If you answered "No" to any question between 23-25 then there is no fraudulent non-disclosure and you
should skip to question _ _ . If you answered "Yes to each question between 23-25 then continue to
the next question.
If you answered "Yes" to question No. 22 or questions No. 23-25 then Printcraft had a duty to disclose a
fact. Printcraft's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not
exist. For the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Printcraft.
Question No. 26: Was the implied statement false?
Answer to Question No. 26: Yes

[_J

No

[_J

Question No. 27: Was the implied statement material?
Answer to Question No. 27: Yes [_J

No [_J

Question No. 28: Did Printcraft know the implied statement was false, or was Printcraft unaware of
whether the implied statement was true?
Answer to Question No. 28: Yes

[_J

No

[_J

Question No.29: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities unaware that the implied statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 29: Yes

LJ

No

[_J

Question No. 30: Did Printcraft intend for Sunnyside Park Utilities to rely upon the implied statement
and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
Answer to Question No. 30: Yes

[_J

No

[_J

Question No. 31: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities rely upon the truth of the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 31: Yes

LJ

No

[_J

Question No. 32: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 32: Yes

[_J

No [

J

Question No. 33: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities suffer damages which were proximately caused be
reliance on the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 33: Yes

LJ

No

[_J

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 26-33 then Sunnyside Park Utilities has not
proven fraudulent non-disclosure and you should skip to question 36. If you answered "Yes" to each and
every question from question 26-33 then continue to answer questions 34 and 35.
Question No. 34: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Sunnyside Park Utilities?
Answer to Question No. 34: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Page 4 of 9
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Question No. 35: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were
proximately caused by Printcraft's fraudulent non-disclosure?
Answer to Question No. 35: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

NUISANCE
Question No. 36: ~id conduct by Printcraft constitute a nuisance?
Answer to Question No. 36: Yes

Ll

No

[_1

If you answered this question "No" you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and advise the bailiff. If
you answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 37: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were
proximately caused by Printcraft's conduct which you found to be a nuisance?
Answer to Question No. 37: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

10JI 1.43.1 (Modified)

APPROVED _ __
REJECTED _ __
MOOIFIED _ __
OTHER _ __
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
INSTRUCTION NO. _ __

An agreement of compromise and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing claims
which the parties intended to settle thereby. The compromise agreement becomes the sole source and
measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing controversy.
If you find that the parties in good faith entered into an agreement compromising and settling
their adverse claims then the settlement agreement is a complete defense to any action based upon any
issues resolved by the settlement agreement.
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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
INSTRUCTION NO.
The defendant has asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. An accord and satisfaction is
a new contract which discharges the rights and obligations created by a previous contract. The
defendant has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:

1.

A bona fide dispute existed between the parties as to the performance due under the original
contract;

2.

The defendant offered some stated performance in full satisfaction of the obligation due under
the original contract;

3.

The plaintiff accepted the performance offered, and understood or reasonably should have
understood, that it constituted full satisfaction of the obligation due under the original contract.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each of the foregoing
propositions has been proved, your verdict should be for the defendant. If you find that any of the
propositions has not been proved, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff.

1822

OFFSET
INSTRUCTION NO.
The defendant has asserted the defense of offset. Offset requires the jury to offset amounts, if
any, found to be due to the plaintiffs against the amount found due to defendants, by deducting the
smaller from the larger, and returning its verdict for the party in whose favor a balance is found due.

18°3
L .
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INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE
I NSTRUCTION NO.
The defendant has asserted the defense of independent intervening cause. An independent
intervening cause is a new and independent cause which breaks the causal connection between the
original wrong and the injury. If you find that the conduct of Printcraft or a third party was in fact the
cause of damages, as opposed to the conduct of Defendants, then you should not award such damages
to Printcraft.
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SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict. This form
consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict form to you now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
BREACH OF CONTRACT
Question No.1: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities prove additional damages, which were not previously
awarded by the Court, for Printcraft's breach of the contract?
Answer to Question No.1: Yes [_1

No

[_1

If you answered this question {{No" skip question 2. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the
next question.
Question No.2: What is the amount of additional damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities for
Printcraft's breach of the contract?
Answer to Question No.2: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Question No.3: Did Printcraft act in good faith and deal fairly with Sunnyside Park Utilities in Printcraft's
performance of the contract?
Answer to Question No.3: Yes

Ll

No

[_1

If you answered this question "No" skip question 4. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the
next question.
Question No.4: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities for Printcraft's
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing?
Answer to Question No.4: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

TRESPASS
Question No.5: Did Printcraft or Printcraft's agents go upon Sunnyside Park Utilities' land?
Answer to Question No.5: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

If you answered this question "No" then there was no Trespass and you should skip question 6. If you
answered this question {{Yes," continue to the next question.

Question No.6: Did Printcraft have consent from Sunnyside Park Utilities to enter upon Sunnyside Park
Utilities land?

[_1

Answer to Question No.6: Yes

No

[_1

If you answered this question "No" then there was no Trespass. If you answered this question flYes/'
then you have found Printcraft committed Trespass. Continue to question NO.7 to determine jf the
trespass was a Willful Trespass.
Question No.7: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities' property posted with "No Trespassing" signs, spaced at
intervals of not less than one (1) notice per six hundred sixty (660) feet along Sunnyside Park Utilities'
property?
Answer to Question No.7: Yes [_1

No [_1

FRAUD
The jury must find the following propositions to have been proven by clear and convincing evidence:
Question No.8: Did Printcraft state a fact to Sunnyside Park Utilities?
Answer to Question No.8: Yes [_1

No

[_1

Question No.9: Was the statement false?
Answer to Question No.9: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

Question No. 10: Was the statement material?
Answer to Question No. 10: Yes

L1

No

[_1

Question No. 11: Did Printcraft know the statement was false, or was Printcraft unaware of whether the
statement was true at the time the statement was made?
Answer to Question No. 11: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

Question No.12: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities unaware that the statement was false?
Answer to Question No. l3: Yes [_1

No [_1

Question No. 14: Did Printcraft intend for Sunnyside Park Utilities to rely upon the statement and act
upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
Answer to Question No.1S: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

Question No. 16: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities rely upon the truth ofthe statement?
Answer to Question No. 17: Yes

l_l

No

[_1

Question No. 18: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities' reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 18: Yes [_1

No [_1

1 8 ,._u
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Question No. 19: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities suffer damages which were proximately caused be
reliance on the statement?
Answer to Question No. 19: Yes [_]

No [_]

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 8-19 then Sunnyside Park Utilities has not
proven fraud and you should skip to question 22. If you answered "Yes" to each and every question from
question 8-19 then continue to answer questions 20 and 21.

Question No. 20: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Sunnyside Park Utilities?
Answer to Question No. 20: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 21: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were
proximately caused by Printcraft's fraud?
Answer to Question No. 21: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

FRAUDULENT NON-DISCLOSURE

Question No. 22: Did Printcraft make a partial or ambiguous statement of fact which was misleading to
Sunnyside Park Utilities?
Answer to Question No. 22: Yes [_1

No [_]

If you answered this question "No" answer questions 23-25. If you answered this question "Yes/' skip
questions 23-25 and begin answering question 26.

Question No. 23: Did Printcraft know a fact that Sunnyside Park Utilities did not know?
Answer to Question No. 23: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

Question No. 24: Was the fact so vital that if the mistake were mutual the contract would be voidable?
Answer to Question No. 24: Yes [_1

No

[---..--l

Question No. 25: Did Printcraft know that Sunnyside Park Utilities did not know the fact?
Answer to Question No. 25: Yes [_1

No

[_J

If you answered "No" to any question between 23-25 then there is no fraudulent non-disclosure and you
should skip to question _ _ . If you answered "Yes to each question between 23-25 then continue to
the next question.
If you answered "Yes" to question No. 22 or questions No. 23-25 then Printcraft had a duty to disclose a
fact. Printcraft's failure to disclose the fact is treated as an affirmative statement that the fact did not
exist. For the following questions I will refer to this as an implied statement by Printcraft.

Question No. 26: Was the implied statement false?
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Answer to Question No. 26: Yes [_1

No [_1

Question No. 27: Was the implied statement material?
Answer to Question No. 27: Yes [_1

No [_1

Question No. 28: Did Printcraft know the implied statement was false, or was Printcraft unaware of
whether the implied statement was true?
Answer to Question No. 28: Yes

[_1

No

[_1

Question No.29: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities unaware that the implied statement was false?
Answer to Question No. 29: Yes [_1

No [_1

Question No. 30: Did Printcraft intend for Sunnyside Park Utilities to rely upon the implied statement
and act upon it in a manner reasonably contemplated?
Answer to Question No. 30: Yes [_1

No [_1

Question No. 31: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities rely upon the truth of the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 31: Yes [_1

No [_1

Question No. 32: Was Sunnyside Park Utilities reliance reasonable under all of the circumstances?
Answer to Question No. 32: Yes

Ll

No

[_1

Question No. 33: Did Sunnyside Park Utilities suffer damages which were proximately caused be
reliance on the implied statement?
Answer to Question No. 33: Yes [

1

No

[_1

If you answered "No" on anyone question from questions 26-33 then Sunnyside Park Utilities has not
proven fraudulent non-disclosure and you should skip to question 36. If you answered flYes" to each and
every question from question 26-33 then continue to answer questions 34 and 35.
Question No. 34: What is the nature and extent of the damages suffered by Sunnyside Park Utilities?
Answer to Question No. 34: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Question No. 35: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were
proximately caused by Printcraft's fraudulent non-disclosure?
Answer to Question No. 35: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

NUISANCE
Question No. 36: Did conduct by Printcraft constitute a nuisance?

1828

Answer to Question No. 36: Yes

Ll

No

[_1

If you answered this question "No" you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and advise the bailiff. If
you answered this question "Yes," continue to the next question.
Question No. 37: What is the amount of damages proven by Sunnyside Park Utilities which were
proximately caused by Printcraft's conduct which you found to be a nuisance?
Answer to Question No. 37: We award the following amount of damages: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISB No. 6996
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
jeff@beardstclair.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho
corporation, TRAVIS WATERS, an
indi vidual,
Case No.: CV-06-7097
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
vs.
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual,
KIRK WOOLF, an individual,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard
St. Clair Gaffney PA, respectfully objects to the following proposed jury instructions
submitted by the defendants. Printcraft reserves the right to further object at trial. To the
extent any of the jury instructions submitted by any of the defendants' conflict with
Plaintiff's Objections to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions Page 1
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instructions submitted by Printcraft, Printcraft objects to the defendants' instructions 011
that basis and request that the COUlt utilize instructions submitted by Printcraft.

DOYLE BECK'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1. Facts Not in Dispute-misstates the facts.
2. Duty to Disclose-misstates the law and the requirements of Printcraft's burden
at trial.
3. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-generaI)--misstates the law and
operative facts and is confusing.
4. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-connections)-misstates the law and
operative facts, is confusing, and is cumulative.
5. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-limitations)-misstates the law and
operative facts, is confusing, and is cumulative.
6. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-Third Party Beneficiary Agreement
and Rules and Rcgulations)-misstates the party to which it applies; misstates the law, is
confusing, and is cumulative.
7. Reliance-misstates the law.
8. Reasonable reliance

misstates the law, is confusing, misleading, and cumulative

9. Unenforceable Contract-misstates facts; misstates law.

KIRK 'WOOLF'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1. Facts Not in Dispute-misstates the facts.
2. Duty to Disclose-misstates the law and the requirements of Printcraft's burden
at trial.
3.

Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft tfaud-general)--misstates the law and

operative facts and is confusing.
Plaintiffs Objectirg~~DIfclldallts' Proposed Jury Instructions Page 2
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4. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-connections)-misstates the law and
operative facts, is confusing, and is cumulative.
5. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-limitations)-misstates the law and
operative facts, is confusing, and is cumulative.
6. Fraudulent Non-Disclosure (Printcraft fraud-Third Party Beneficiary Agreement
and Rules and Regulations)-misstates the party to which it applies; misstates the law, is
confusing, and is cumulative.
7. Reliance-misstates the law.
8. Reasonable reliance - misstates the law, is confusing, misleading, and cumulative
9. Unenforceable Contract--misstates facts; misstates law.
SUNNYSIDE PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1. Instruction No. I-misstates the facts; contains inelevant instructions re: facts;
cumulative.
2. Instruction No.2 - confusing and difficult to understand; cumulative; should
utilize Plaintiffs instruction regarding duty to disclose
3. Instruction No.3-misstates the law; cumulative; confusing.
4. Instruction No. 4----misstates the facts and the law; cumulative; confusing.
5. Instruction No.5-misstates the law; cumulative; confusing.
6. Instruction No.6 - misstates the law; cumulative; confusing
7. Instruction No.7-misstates the law; cumulative; confusing.
8. Instruction No.8-misstates the facts and the law; cumulative; confusing.
9. Instruction No.9-misstates the law; cumulative; confusing.
10. Instruction No. Il-irrelevant; confusing.
11. Instruction No.12-misstatcs the law; confusing.
Plailltiff~s Objections to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instructions
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12. Instruction No. 13 - misstates the law; cumulative; confusing.
13. Instruction No. 16--misstates the facts and the law; irrelevant; unnecessary;
cumulative.
14. Instruction No. 17-irrelevant; misstates the law.
15. Instruction No. I8-irrelevant; misleading; misstates the law; cumulative.
16. Instruction No. 19-not based on the evidence; misleading; misstates the facts;
irrelevant; confusing.
17. Instruction Nos. 20 & 2 I-misstate the law and facts; confusing; cumulative.
18. Instruction No. 22-misstates the facts and the law; misleading; irrelevant.
19. Instruction No. 23-misstates the law and misleading.
20. Instruction No. 24--misstates the law; misleading; cumulative.
21. Instruction No. 25 - misstates the law; cumulative.
22. Instruction No. 27-misstates the law and the facts.
23. Instruction No. 29-misstates the law; not a jury question.
24. Instruction No. 30-irrelevant; fails to describe the specific claim to which
punitive damages may be awarded, if any.
DATED: February 24, 2009

Plaintiffs Objections to Defendants' Proposed Jury Instrllctions Page 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

r certify r am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on February 24, 2009, I
served a true and correct copy ofthe PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO DEFENDANTS'
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS on the following by the method of delivery
designated below:
Mark Fuller
Fuller & Can
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935
Fax: (208)524-7167
Bryan Smith
McGrath & Smith
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731
Fax: (208) 529-4166

o U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

r:zr;:csimile

o U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

lliacsimile

//

Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N. Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Fax: (208)529-1300

o U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

CdFacsimile

rney
. Brunson
Beard St. Clair GafTney PA
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISH No. 3558
Jeffrey D. Brunson, ISH No. 6996
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA
2) 05 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495
Telephone: (208) 523-5171
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com
jef1(?i!-beardstclair.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiff

DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC. an Idaho
corporation, TRAVIS WATERS, an
individual,
Case No.: CV-06·7097

Plainli ftlCounterdefendant,
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS FOR JNOV, NEW TRIAL,
AND DIRECTED VERDICT
vs.
SUNNYSIDE PARK UTILITIES, INC., an
Idaho corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK
OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC .. an
Idaho corporation, and SUNNYSIDE
INDUSTRIAL AND PROFESSIONAL
PARK, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company, DOYLE BECK, an individual,
KIRK WOOLF, an individual,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.
The plaintiff, Printcraft Press, Inc. (Printcraft), through counsel of record, Beard
st. Clair Gaffney PA, hereby objects to all post-trial motions filed by the defendants. The

post-trial motions are not supported in either law or fact. Since 110 judgment on the
verdict has been entered, the post-trial motions have been prematurely tiled. Printcraft
Objection to Defendants' Motions for JNOV, New Trial, and Directed Verdict Page
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03-26-2009

reserves the right to supplement this objection \vith detailed briefing once judgment on
the verdict is entered and a hearing date is set for the post-trial motions.
DATED: March 26, 2009
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Michpe~ D: Gaffney
JeffreYD. Brunson
Of Beard St. Clair GafTney PA
Attomcys for Printcraft Press, Inc.

Objection to Defendants' Motions for JNOV, New TriaJ, and Directed Verdict Page 2
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03-26-2009

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certily I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on March 26, 2009, I

served a true

~U1d

correct copy of the OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR

.INOV, NEW TRIAL, AND DIRECTED VERDICT on the following by the method of
delivery designated below:
Mark Fuller
Fuller & Carr
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, 10 83405-0935
Fax: (208) 524-7167
Bryan D. Smith
Smith, Driscoll & Associates
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, 10 83405-0731
Fax: (208) 529-4166

o U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

GF:csimile

o U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

fLlr;:csimile

~/

Bonneville County Courthollse
605 N. Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, 10 83402
Fax: (208) 529-1300

o U.S. Mail

0

Hand-delivered

O/iacsimile
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- ,/~\.'-----.~~ / :
Mich~r GafIney
,
~

\

Jeffrey!{!/Brunson
Beard St. Claif Gaffney PA
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Objection to Defendants' Motions for JNOV, New Trial. and Directed Vel'diet Page 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an
Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-06-7097

vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES,
Idaho corporation,

INC., an

Defendant.
On the 27th day of February, 2009, Defendant's motion in
limine to exclude written leases came before the Honorable Joel
E. Tingey, District Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls,

Idaho.

Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. Michael Gaffney and Mr. Jeff Brunson appeared on behalf
of the Plaintiff.
Mr. Mark Fuller appeared on behalf of the Defendant
Sunnyside Utilities.
Mr. Bryan Smith appeared on behalf of Defendant Doyle Beck
and Kirk Woolf.
Mr. Fuller presented Defendant's motion in limine to exclude
written leases.

Mr. Gaffney argued in opposition to the motion.

Mr. Smith joined in Defendant's motion in limine re: leases.
Mr. Fuller presented rebuttal argument.
The Court granted the motion to exclude written leases.

1838

The

Court will not allow Smith's testimony regarding rental payment
loss.
The Court will prepare an order on its ruling.
Court was thus adjourned.

H:cv067097.8
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of February, 2009,

I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Michael Gaffney
Jeff Brunson
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

Mark R. Fuller
Dan Beck
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID

83405

Bryan Smith
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID

83405
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DIST~CT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNtVl00E27

Pl2 :47

PRINTCRAFT PRESS, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
Case No. CV -06-7097
Plaintiff,
vs.
SUNNYSIDE UTILITIES, INC., and Idaho
Corporation, SUNNYSIDE PARK OWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., and Idaho Corporation,
and SUNNYSIDE INDUSTRIAL AND
PROFESSIONAL PARK, LLC, and Idaho
limited liability corporation,

ORDER IN RE: EXCLUSION OF
WOOLF'S PRIOR FELONY
CONVICTION

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant Kirk Woolf's motion in limine.
Woolf's motion seeks to prevent the plaintiffs from presenting evidence of Woolf's prior
felony conviction of approximately 25 years ago. The Court finds that a hearing on the
motion is not necessary.
Generally, evidence of prior felony convictions offered for the purpose of
attacking a witness' credibility is only admissible if its probative value outweighs its
prejudicial effect. See LR.E. 609 (a). Under LR.E. 609 (b), evidence of a witness' felony
conviction is inadmissible "if a period of more than ten (10) years has elapsed since the
date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for
that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of
justice, that the probative value of the conviction suppOlied by specific facts and
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect."

ORDER - 1
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The Court finds that based on the nature of the conviction and the time that has
elapsed since the conviction, any probative value of the conviction is outweighed by the
potential for unfair prejudice. Accordingly, Woolfs motion is granted and the Parties are
precluded from presenting evidence of any such conviction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this ...L.4-'--,-day of February, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

g
r"

I hereby certify that on this ~ day of February 2009, I did send a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document upo the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox;
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.

Bryan D. Smith
Smith, Driscoll & Associates
P.O. Box 50731
414 Shoup Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Mark R. Fuller
Daniel R. Beck
FULLER & CARR
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-9035

Michael D. Gaffney
Lance 1. Shuster
Jeffrey D. Brunson
Beard S1. Clair Gaffney
2105 Coronado St.
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

Deputy Clerk

ORDER- 3
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